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Kvanttimekaniikan filosofia ja etenkin keskustelu kvanttimekaniikan tulkinnoista ovat säilyttäneet 
pääpiirteiset erimielisyytensä kvanttiteorian alkuajoista asti nykypäivään. Tässä tutkielmassa 
täsmennetään kiistan ydinkysymyksiä ja etsitään mahdollisuuksia vastata niihin analysoimalla tulkinnan 
käsitettä. 
 
Kysymysten kehystämiseksi esitellään kaksi perinteistä tulkintaa kvanttiteoriasta, Kööpenhaminan 
tulkinta ja de Broglien-Bohmin tulkinta. Metodologisena valintana tulkintoja käsitellään rajatusti 
tulkintoina kvanttiteoriasta, ei erillisinä teorioina. Kööpenhaminan tulkintaa käsitellään kvanttiteorian 
perusmateriaalin sekä tulkinnan 1930-luvun oleellisimpien kirjoittajien, Werner Heisenbergin ja Niels 
Bohrin teosten avulla. Kööpenhaminan tulkinnan argumentoidaan olevan kvanttiteorian tulkintaa vain 
triviaalissa mielessä. Sen teoreettinen sisältö eroaa häviävän vähän itse kvanttiteoriasta ja sen rajat 
ylittävän spekulaation hylkäämisestä. De Broglien-Bohmin tulkinta esitellään Louis de Broglien 
pilottiaaltoteorian ja myöhemmän David Bohmin ontologisen tulkinnan kautta. Tulkinta formuloi teorian 
matemaattisen ytimen vaihtoehtoisella tavalla – käyttämällä aaltofunktion polaarista muotoa niin sanotun 
kvantti-Hamilton-Jacobin johtamiseksi Schrödingerin yhtälöstä, mikä mahdollistaa kvanttiteorian 
standardimuotoilusta poikkeavien termien eristämisen. Tulkinta säilyttää kvanttiteorian empiiriset 
ennusteet tuottavan rakenteen. 
 
Kahden eri tulkinnan kannattajien välisen kiistan täsmennetään syntyvän epäselvyydestä ja 
erimielisyydestä tulkinnan arvioinnin standardeista, kuten yksinkertaisuudesta, kuvausvoimasta tai 
periaatteellisista mahdollisuuksista muodostaa uusia tutkimushypoteeseja. Kiistan ratkaisemiseksi 
tutkielmassa edetään purkamaan itse tulkinnan käsite. Sen käyttöä tutkitaan fysiikan mallikeskustelun, 
semanttisen logiikan ja matemaattisen malliteorian yhteyksissä. Tutkielmassa päädytään esittämään 
ehdotus käsitteen ”tulkinta” reunaehdoille: tulkinta tarkoittaa teorian soveltamista haluttuun 
yksittäistilanteeseen. Tulkinta kvanttiteoriasta voi siis olla oikea tai väärä, minkä määrittää soveltamisen 
onnistuminen. Reunaehtoihin sisällytetään yksittäisten mallikomponenttien arviointi, mikä mahdollistaa 
vaihtoehtoisten matemaattisten muotoilujen sisältämien termien arvioinnin kvanttiteorian soveltamisen 
yhteydessä. 
 
Koska tulkintoja käsitellään tutkielmassa yksinomaan kvanttiteorian tulkintoina, päädytään 
johtopäätökseen, että tulkintojen on jaettava kvanttiteorian rakenteelliset rajoitteet. Nämä rajoitteet 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Interpretations of quantum mechanics have become a major point of interest not only in 
the field of physics, but in other disciplines and popular culture as well. For example, 
even philosophy of mind and cognitive science have drawn inspiration from the 
speculations regarding the causal properties of quantum systems. 
However, there are clear differences in opinion regarding what an interpretation should 
and should not do, which leads to vastly different world views. Different weights are 
given to different attributes of the theory: for example, it can be deemed that 
indeterminism in physics is unacceptable, leading to theories that preserve it. 
Alternatively, the necessity of local dynamics might be emphasized, motivating a 
compatible interpretation, and so on. 
It indeed seems that this discussion is kind of a Wild West in the philosophy of science. 
There are contradicting preferences with often little mutual agreement on the standards 
against which to judge them. In this thesis, I will examine two well-known 
interpretations of quantum theory, namely the Copenhagen interpretation and the de 
Broglie Bohm interpretation. The choice is mainly motivated by the distinctions in 
epistemology and ontology between them. The Copenhagen interpretation can be 
characterized as restricting statements to what can be known by the means of 
observation. The de Broglie-Bohm interpretation is selected as a contrast to the 
Copenhagen for its hypotheses of ontology. 
However, the examination here is not a one-to-one comparison between all possible 
properties belonging to these two lines of thought. The contrast is utilized in order to 
find clarity to a more general question concerning the philosophy of quantum physics: 
are there robust scientific or philosophical standards by which disputes between 
contradicting interpretations could be reliably solved? The de Broglie-Bohm 
interpretation is selected as a tangible example of a realist interpretation, that is, an 
interpretation with a commitment for the search of ontology. However, there are other 
such interpretations as well. 
To gain footing in this project, the whole concept of interpretation is taken apart and put 
back together. As will be shown, there is an apparent disregard to any substantive 
standards pertaining to what constitutes an interpretation of quantum theory: instead, it 
is commonly agreed that an interpretation is any theoretical framework that accounts for 
what happens in sub-atomic systems. Interpretations are described in the Stanford 
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Encyclopedia of Philosophy article “Quantum Mechanics” (Ismael 2000) in the 
following way: 
Minimally interpreted, the theory describes a set of facts about the way the 
microscopic world impinges on the macroscopic one, how it affects our 
measuring instruments, described in everyday language or the language of 
classical mechanics. Disagreement centers on the question of what a 
microscopic world, which affects our apparatuses in the prescribed 
manner, is, or even could be, like intrinsically; or how those apparatuses 
could themselves be built out of microscopic parts of the sort the theory 
describes. 
That is what an interpretation of the theory would provide: a proper 
account of what the world is like according to quantum mechanics, 
intrinsically and from the bottom up. 
This is a starting point for this examination, but as a qualifying ruleset, nowhere near 
sufficient. Consequently, a robust proposition for rules of what counts as an 
interpretation of quantum theory will be attempted in this thesis. 
In the second chapter, the history of quantum physics will be summarized. I’ll start from 
the early observations of light leading up to the models of light as electromagnetic 
fields. Then, the concept of photons is introduced as the first example of wave-particle-
duality, and the idea is extended to electrons through the de Broglie matter waves. 
Leading up to the modern theory, the Schrödinger equation is presented along with the 
alternative formulation provided by matrix mechanics. 
The rest of the second chapter is dedicated to the Copenhagen interpretation, the 
uncertainty principle and methodological discussions of the 1920’s and 30’s. It will be 
seen that through this discussion, the current understanding of the epistemic limitations 
of quantum theory was solidified. 
The third chapter is solely a presentation of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation, using 
as the main source David Bohm and Basil Hiley’s 1993 book “The Undivided 
Universe”, which encompasses the most elaborate version of the de Broglie-Bohm 
interpretation by its original author.1 Later developments, especially in the field of 
Bohmian mechanics, will not be studied as they fall outside the scope of this thesis. 
The second half of the third chapter discusses the conflict between the Copenhagen and 
the de Broglie-Bohm interpretations, as well as general criticisms received by the latter. 
In an important role are so-called “no-go theorems” which aim to prove the 
 
1 An exhaustive treatment is also provided by Holland (1993). 
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impossibility of hidden variables in quantum mechanics. Their role in limiting the scope 
of what is possible in the context of quantum mechanics is clarified: they inevitably rule 
out improvements in accuracy in the domain of quantum theory – but do not claim to 
exclude the entirety of so-called “hidden variable interpretations”2. The two theorems 
addressed – the von Neumann proof and the Kochen-Specker theorem – are also seen to 
operate on slightly different domains. While the von Neumann proof has to do with the 
basic characteristics of any theory pertaining to quantum mechanics, the Kochen-
Specker theorem addresses the absolute limits of quantum theory itself. It will also be 
concluded that the de Broglie-Bohm is not a separate theory (from quantum theory) 
because of the equivalence of its predictions. 
The fourth chapter is devoted to finding out what an interpretation of quantum theory is. 
I start by examining some general texts regarding models in physics and attempt to 
identify the kinds of models that are relevant to subatomic phenomena. After getting 
some pointers, I will move forward to examine the notion of interpretation. At this 
point, we already have some sort of an understanding of an interpretation – which the 
relation between a model and the subject it represents. This will be scrutinized further 
by examining basic semantics and then moving to model theory and some attempts at a 
formal system of empirical models. Relevant ques are taken here without commitment 
to any particular framework, for example that of mathematical model theory. 
These ideas are then briefly measured against further discussion on models in physics, 
after which I present my final formulation of how interpretation, and interpreting, could 
be generally understood in the domain of quantum theory. Most importantly, it is 
proposed that an interpretation is the act of understanding the theory’s reference to 
phenomena. Having given the set of statements regarding what an interpretation is, the 
Copenhagen and de Broglie-Bohm interpretations are both shown to be an ill fit for the 
concept. The Copenhagen interpretation is essentially nothing but a set of statements 
that are immediate consequences of the empirical limitations of quantum theory. The de 
Broglie-Bohm interpretation, respectively, abides by the rules of interpretation (as 
suggested in this thesis) only when crucial ontological statements regarding its 
components are omitted. 
Central to everything that is discussed is the axiom that there is only one quantum 
theory and differing interpretations (in the accustomed sense) of quantum theory, 
 
2 The notion of “hidden variables” is intentionally left in quotations because of its loose definition – more 
on this in III.III. 
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whatever their actual nature may be. Thus, the no-go theorems pertaining to quantum 
theory itself are given a strong emphasis – if these theorems were to be worked around, 
in any shape or form, there is strong reason to argue that this would mean a completely 
new theory of sub-atomic phenomena. 
The goal of this thesis is ambitious in the sense that I seek to give a proper definition of 
interpretation, and interpretations, in the domain of quantum theory. However, nothing 
far-reaching is attempted here – the main commitment is to stick to what we know for a 
fact at all times. This does not exclude philosophy, nor does it say anything general 
about philosophy of physics – but, hopefully, a better picture of what can be said of 
physics itself will arise. 
 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF QUANTUM THEORY 
 
To understand the problems discussed in this thesis, it is necessary to go over the 
fundamentals of quantum mechanics. I will first briefly look at the core experiments 
performed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries that laid the groundwork for modern 
quantum theory. After this, I will describe the basic wave equations and concepts that 
hold in current quantum mechanics. 
Some special attention is given to matrix mechanics and operator formalisms. The 
motivation for this is that Schrödinger’s wave mechanics follows more intuitively from 
the preceding experiments and models, whereas matrix mechanics treat observables in a 
different picture3. This picture is, however, important to cash out, as the mathematical 
treatment is illuminating in the context of interpretations of quantum physics. 
Finally, I will address the wave function as it is central to most quantum mechanics and 
show how the motivation for interpretations arises from ontological issues associated 
with it. The origin of the received view of quantum mechanics, the Copenhagen 
interpretation, is briefly discussed due to its close relation to the development of 
fundamental models of modern quantum theory. 
 
 
3 The notion of 'picture', as will be expanded later, is a semi-technical term relating to the mathematical 
framework being utilized.  
5 
 
II.I. EARLY EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
Following Richard Feynman (Greene 1999), it is fruitful to approach quantum 
mechanics as we know it today by examining experiments on light. The wave nature of 
light was first discovered by Thomas Young (1802) by simple experiments involving 
paper and sunlight. Contradicting the then-prevalent corpuscular theory of light, in 
which light was modelled as travelling in straight rays, light was found to exhibit wave-
like attributes when directed through small enough slits. Observing light on the other 
side of one slit, the pattern formed by it was found not to be of the shape of the slit, but 
rather a diffraction pattern with minimums and maximums of intensity. Similarly, an 
experiment with two or more slits produced more elaborate diffraction patterns, which 
were fully in line with a model of interference between wave fronts. 
Young’s paper led physicists to adopt the wave theory of light, which simply stated that 
light has a wave-nature. This was to say that patterns found in other wave motions, such 
as diffraction of waves in fluids, were found to be similar with the behaviour of light. 
James Clerk Maxwell (1865) proceeded to show that light is a propagating wave 
exhibiting both electric and magnetic qualities, or in other words, electromagnetic 
radiation. This, among other things, lead to an understanding that light carries energy 
with it. 
The question of electromagnetic radiation was linked to temperature when, later in the 
19th century, physicists endeavoured to explain the relation of between the intensity and 
wavelength of the radiance that physical bodies emit. This is what later came to be 
called the black body problem. Kirchhoff (1860) explained that a body of a given shape 
and size in a thermal equilibrium4 has a universal ratio between the coefficient of 
absorbed radiance and emitted radiance, which only depends on wavelength and 
temperature. The coefficient is given by the ratio between reflected and absorbed light, 
where for a perfectly black body all radiation will be absorbed (i.e. a perfectly black 
body does not reflect any light). This yields Kirchhoff’s law which states that for a 
given wavelength, the amount of radiation absorbed equals the amount emitted. This 
can be stated mathematically as 𝛼𝜆 = 𝜖𝜆. 
However, the exact relation between wavelength and intensity was not known. Rayleigh 
and Jeans (1905) constructed a model which stated that as the wavelength of emitted 
 
4 Thermal equilibrium is a state where there is no flow of states in a system from less entropic to greater. 
In other words, the examined system has an equal temperature in all its regions. 
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radiance decreases, its intensity increases as an exponential function. In terms of 
wavelength, it was written as (Rybicki & Lightman 1979, 20—27): 
𝐵𝜆(𝑇) =
2𝑐𝑘𝐵𝑇
𝜆4
, 
where 𝐵𝜆(𝑇) denotes the power emitted per unit emitting area, per unit wavelength, per 
steradian, c the speed of light, 𝑘𝐵 the Boltzmann constant, T the temperature and the 𝜆 
wavelength. The important feature of this equation is that the power emitted is 
proportional to 𝜆−4, which is determined by empirical testing.  
The problem of the Rayleigh-Jeans model was that empirical findings were obviously 
against it. According to the model, when moving towards shorter wavelengths, and thus 
towards higher frequencies, the spectral radiance of the body starts to quickly approach 
infinity. In reality, this is not and cannot be the case, because the energy radiated by a 
body must be finite. Moreover, the amount of radiated energy would violate the 
principle of conservation of energy. A model with a solution to this problem (which is 
sometimes coined “the ultraviolet catastrophe”) was, however, given earlier by Planck. 
In his (1900b) paper he proposed as a solution his equation: 
𝐵𝜆(𝜆, 𝑇) =
2ℎ𝑐2
𝜆5
1
ⅇ
ℎ𝑐
𝜆𝑘𝐵𝑇 − 1
, 
where h is the Planck constant. The relation is still inversely reactive to wavelength. 
However, here the inclusion of the Planck constant (6.626 ∗ 10−34 𝐽 𝑠) results in the 
equation for radiance converging towards zero after around 𝜆 = 0.5 μ𝑚, as confirmed 
by experimental results. 
The significance of h, the Planck constant, should be emphasized. Although originally it 
was seen as a mere mathematical tool needed to derive proper predictions by means of 
quantifying over discrete values, the physical meaning of the constant became more 
robust in Einstein’s theory of the photoelectric effect. The photoelectric effect refers to 
the emission of electrons by a conductive material when hit by light. According to 
classical wave theory, the kinetic energy of electrons emitted should be proportional to 
the energy carried by the light that is directed at the material, that is, its intensity.  
Empirical tests showed this to not be the case. Instead, two key observations of the 
phenomenon needed clarification. First, it was observed that no electrons are emitted 
below a certain frequency of light. This is called the threshold frequency. Secondly, 
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when going above the threshold frequency, it was shown that the kinetic energy of 
emitted electrons was independent of the intensity of light, but dependent on its 
frequency by positive correlation. Einstein (1905) developed a mathematical model 
encompassing these observations: 
𝐾𝑚 = ℎ𝑓 − 𝜑 
𝜑 = ℎ𝑓0 
𝐾𝑚 = ℎ(𝑓 − 𝑓0) 
Here, 𝐾𝑚 corresponds to the maximum kinetic energy carried by the electron, and 𝜑 is a 
work function denoting the minimum work required to move the electron. Given the 
threshold frequency, the work function can be written as the product of the Planck 
constant5 and the minimum frequency for the emission as found by experimentation. 
The quantization used in the black body radiation model quantizes the kinetic energy 
states of electrons (the Planck constant is utilized in both). To note is that the energy 
itself is still a continuum above the threshold frequency – it's just zero below it. This led 
to early notions of discrete values for some properties of light, contrasting to the 
continua in classical wave theories. The explanation, proposed by Einstein, was that 
light is transferred as “packets of energy” that are indivisible6. This idea is considered to 
be fundamental to the early development of quantum mechanics. 
I will now turn to the development of atomic theory. Building from early 
phenomenological models towards a more fundamental theory, Bohr and Rutherford 
(1913) formed the first functional theoretical model of a hydrogen atom. Following the 
discovery of the atomic nucleus in Geiger-Marsden experiments of 1909, combined 
with earlier understanding of electrons, Rutherford started to sketch an early model of 
the hydrogen atom (1911). His model consisted of a solid nucleus and a cloud of 
electrons around it, in a motion resembling planetary orbits. The model was structurally 
somewhat close to current understanding of the hydrogen atom, but it was plagued by 
problems due to the classical predictions it entailed. Because the electromagnetic theory 
of radiation tells that electrons in motion emit radiation, the law of conservation of 
energy dictates that the total energy of the electron must diminish accordingly. The 
energy emitted by radiation is due to the electron’s kinetic energy. Therefore, according 
 
5 The relation E=hf was already introduced by Planck in 1901. 
6 The same idea of quantization of light is a physical explanation of the black body phenomenon as well, 
as formulated by Planck. 
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to the model, the electron should “fall” to the nucleus – leading to the instability of all 
atoms. 
Bohr’s solution to this problem was to quantize the orbits of the electrons. This solution 
combined the earlier approach to the electron’s energy levels by classical modelling and 
a quantum boundary condition: 
𝑣 = √
𝑍𝑘𝑒ⅇ2
𝑚𝑒𝑟
 
𝐸 = −
1
2
𝑚𝑒𝑣
2 
𝑚𝑒𝑣𝑟 = 𝑛ℏ, 𝑛 ∈ ℕ 
Here, 𝑚𝑒 denotes the mass of the electron, e its charge, Z the charge number of the 
nucleus (i.e. the atomic number) and 𝑘𝑒 is Coulomb’s electrostatic constant, E is the 
total energy of the electron and v its velocity and n is the electron's orbital quantum 
number. The first two of the equations above are classical models for velocity and 
energy of the electron in orbit around the nucleus, whereas the third one describes a 
quantum boundary condition.  
In a rough analogy with planetary orbits, the velocity of the electron depends on the 
product of its charge with that of the nucleus, as well as its distance from it. The total 
energy takes the classical form of a kinetic energy equation. However, the values of the 
electron’s angular momentum (𝑚𝑒𝑣𝑟) are strictly discrete, so that they can only be 
multiples of the reduced Planck constant7. The physical meaning of this is that there 
must be discrete solutions for the radius r, and thus for the corresponding energy states 
E. No states outside of those that are dictated by 𝑛ℏ are allowed. To satisfy the 
conservation of energy, the electron at a stable orbit does not radiate energy. The lowest 
state, ℏ, corresponds to the lowest possible orbit, thus making atoms in the model stable. 
Energy is absorbed or emitted as radiation only by switching orbits, and the 
corresponding energies of these transitions can be determined by simple calculations of 
energy differences of orbits. 
 
 
7 ℏ =
ℎ
2𝜋
. This defines the quantum constant for angular momentum. 
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II.II. THE MODERN THEORY 
 
Overarching early quantum theories of light and matter is a duality of wave- and 
particle-like properties. The Planck constant found in the cases of black body radiation, 
photoelectric effect and the hydrogen atom model suggests indivisible units of light 
which do not conform to classical wave-like models. The idea of such undivided units 
as a physical property was gradually accepted towards the early twenties and 
demonstrated further in 1923 by Compton scattering. In this experiment, electrons are 
bombarded with light of higher energy than in the photoelectric effect (Compton, for 
instance, used an X-ray beam), so that the light is not fully absorbed but rather scattered 
inelastically, causing the electrons to recoil. 
A classical wave model of light necessitates that without any external or emergent 
forces present, the scattered light must have the same wavelength as the incident light. 
In Compton's experiment, however, it was found that the scattered light demonstrates a 
shift to a higher wavelength. This can be explained by the earlier prediction from the 
photoelectric effect, 𝐾𝑚 = ℎ𝑓, but applying the kinetic energy relation to the scattered 
light in addition to the recoiling electron. If there is a physical particle in the incident 
light colliding with the electron, the wavelength shift can be explained by the loss of 
energy of scattered particles. This is turn would lead to a lower frequency of the 
scattered light. Finally, these particles of light were coined ‘photons’ by Gilbert Lewis 
in 1926. 
Even though the physical existence of both wave- and particle-like behaviour was 
evident, the exact relation between the two was not clear. Especially perplexing was that 
photons exhibited wave-like behaviour; this could not be reconciled with classical 
electromagnetic theory. This question can be framed as the first fundamental question of 
quantum mechanics and will be returned to later on. However, another question was 
posed about the possibility of electrons exhibiting wave-like behaviour. This presented 
the possibility of finding a unified underlying empirical theory. 
The first physicist to hypothesize about such wave-like properties of electrons was 
Louis de Broglie in 1924. His idea was that the relations between photons and waves in 
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light are universal to all particles. His fundamental equation describing the properties of 
so-called matter waves8 linked the momentum of an electron to a wavelength: 
𝜆 =
ℎ
𝑝
=
ℎ
𝑚𝑣
 
This is to be understood as a generalization of the relation already observed in the 
photoelectric effect, where the momentum of the electron (necessitating a corresponding 
momentum of the photon) is dependent on the frequency of the light. This equation 
proved to yield correct experimental predictions.9 The natural question then was: if 
electrons exhibit wave-like behaviour, is there a corresponding wave equation to be 
found? 
 
II.II.I. THE SCHRÖDINGER EQUATION 
 
Erwin Schrödinger proposed a quantum wave equation in 1926, partly inspired by 
Hamilton’s principal function10. The model offered was a linear partial differential 
equation, which could predict the total energy states of the system by operating on a 
function describing a wave. Additionally, the equation had to encompass development 
over time. Otherwise, it could not fully describe the transitions of electron orbits. This 
equation could not be mathematically derived from other fundamental equations of 
physics, but was construed through logical arguments, de Broglie relations and close 
study of preceding experimental results particularly regarding the hydrogen atom. 
Schrödinger’s solution for a non-relativistic particle was finally presented as: 
ⅈℏ
∂
∂𝑡
Ψ(r⃗, 𝑡) = (−
ℏ2
2𝑚
∇2 + 𝑉(r⃗)) Ψ(r⃗, 𝑡), 
where i is the imaginary unit and V(𝑟) the potential of the system. Ψ(r⃗, 𝑡) represents the 
wave function with r⃗ being the wave displacement. In his 1926 paper Schrödinger 
proceeded to show that this equation was able to reproduce the spectral series of the 
hydrogen atom. This was accomplished by modelling the electron as the wave function 
and the attraction caused by interaction with the proton by the potential term V. 
 
8 For de Broglie, the fundamental relation between waves and particles did not mean they refer to the 
same objects: the matter wave concept was understood by him to model two different entities and served 
as the basis for the pilot wave theory. 
9 See Thomson (1927). 
10 I.e. the Hamilton-Jacobi equations. These unified Newtonian notions of particle mechanics and optics 
and were able to represent particle motion by wave equations. 
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Although lacking a relativistic correction, the fact that it correctly predicted the 
behaviour of particles as a wave equation made it the most utilized equation of all 
quantum physics.  
Despite the equation’s predictive accuracy, the nature of the wave function itself was 
early on recognized as a question regarding the Schrödinger equation. Even though its 
form can be derived from the differential equation, it does not directly correspond to 
observables: all predictions regarding observations are results of operating on it; such as 
probability densities and expectation values. The fact that the Schrödinger equation’s 
form resembles that of a classical wave equation led to early ontological questions 
regarding the nature and behaviour of objects in quantum mechanical systems. But 
before these can be discussed further, a summary of another approach of a unified 
formalism in quantum mechanics is still needed. 
 
II.II.II. MATRIX MECHANICS 
 
Slightly before the time of formulation of wave mechanics, another form of quantum 
mechanics encompassing time-dependency was moulded by Heisenberg, Born and 
Jordan (1926) with preceding contributions from Heisenberg (1925) as well as Born and 
Jordan (1925). Their version of the quantum theory was called ‘matrix mechanics’ after 
its treatment of physical properties of particles by matrices. In order to avoid the 
difficulties of summarizing the content of Heisenberg’s original 1925 paper, I will 
outline instead the modern core formulations of matrix mechanics and its operators 
along with their physical references. Ques are taken from Ludyk (2018). 
The core idea of matrix mechanics is to work within an operator formalism which 
corresponds only to known observables and their probability distributions (along with 
expectation values). This is a break away from speculative models such as the hydrogen 
atom model11: in matrix mechanics, no underlying physical structures are assumed 
which cannot be directly observed. What this means in more concrete terms is that the 
 
11 The hydrogen atom model is heuristic but speculative – it is not observed for a single electron that the 
nucleus is orbited by it, or an electron cloud for that matter. Instead, these are tangible pictures that are 
given for statistical rules for predicting energy states from localizations of wave packets, etc. In terms 
empirical results, the physical idea of the orbital nucleus-electron system is not warranted. However, the 
electron orbit can be constructed with an ensemble of a large number of electron detections (e.g. Stodolna 
et al. 2013). 
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mathematical picture does not include any terms referring to wave or particle motion, 
for instance. Instead, statistical patterns are inferred from operator evolutions alone. 
The reason the outlines of matrix mechanics are presented here is the fact that this 
framework neither supposes nor suggests anything of any kinds of wave or particle 
natures of quantum systems, atomic models, and so forth. Instead, only observed states 
are predicted in an operator formalism. This is to showcase the fact that to correctly 
cash out all the empirical content of subatomic phenomena, no commitments to 
anything else than observation is required. Moreover, some properties of the phenomena 
as described by quantum theory can be understood to be inevitable results of the 
mathematical framework they are included in. These themes will be discussed in greater 
detail in III.III. 
The fundamental equations of matrix mechanics start with the explication of the so-
called uncertainty principle, as observed by experimentation. In terms of physical 
phenomena, the uncertainty principle states that two (non-commuting) observables12, 
such as position and momentum, cannot be simultaneously observed with arbitrary 
accuracy, but that increasing accuracy for one decreases accuracy for the other.13 In 
matrix mechanics, this is stated as a commutation relation: 
[?̂?, ?̂?] = ?̂??̂? − ?̂??̂? = ⅈℏ 
This residue is caused by the matrix form of the operators ?̂? and ?̂?. Non-commutative 
pairs of operators simply entail that their order of operation cannot be chosen arbitrarily. 
The commutator above is presented above with mere operators, but in real solutions 
they operate on a function. For example: 
[?̂?, ?̂?]|𝜓⟩ = (?̂??̂? − ?̂??̂?)|𝜓⟩ = (?̂? − 𝑥0𝐼)?̂?|𝜓⟩ =  ⅈℏ|𝜓⟩, 
where |𝜓⟩ denotes the vertical eigenstate vector of position (i.e. the eigenvector, or the 
state vector) with the constant eigenvalue 𝑥0, which can be defined in three-dimensional 
space by the relation 
 
12 By ‘observables’ I mean quantities that directly correspond to phenomena that can be observed. This 
term is applied while recognizing the disagreements associated with it. For an exposé of the subject, see 
Bell (1987, 52—62). 
13 It will shortly be explicated that this loss of accuracy is not due to shortcomings of measurement 
equipment but an inseparable attribute of quantum mechanics itself. See II.II.III.II. 
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?̂?|𝜓⟩ = 𝑥0|𝜓⟩ = (𝑥𝑥 𝑥𝑦 𝑥𝑧) (
𝜓𝑥
𝜓𝑦
𝜓𝑧
), 
where we find 𝑥0 as the eigenvalue if it yields the product of ?̂? and |𝜓⟩ by scalar 
multiplication. This expression is equivalent to (?̂? − 𝑥0𝐼) |𝜓⟩ = 0, which is of the form 
we find from the canonical commutation relation. Here, 𝐼 is the identity operator in 
three dimensions, of the matrix form: 
[
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
] 
From these equations we can see that if |𝜓⟩ were the eigenstate of momentum as well, 
the result would be similarly zero. Now that the canonical commutation relation is 
understood, the job becomes to show how to derive the energy states found from the 
orbital transitions of electrons. This overview will be done in some detail, because it is 
an efficient demonstration of matrix mechanics. I will start by assigning an operator A 
for an observable a, as previously done for position and momentum, and defining it as 
the expectation operator by the integral 
∫ 𝜓𝑚
∗ 𝐴𝑚𝑛𝜓𝑛 ⅆ𝑥. 
which, by integrating over m, gives the expectation value for the eigenstate 𝜓𝑛 to return 
the eigenvalue of energy 𝐸𝑛.
14 In this formalism, time evolution is in respect to the 
operators and not the state vectors they operate on. The operator A here is defined as the 
combined matrix of operators ?̂? and ?̂?. The core idea is that the time differential of A 
relates to energy states by the equation: 
ⅆ𝐴𝑚𝑛
ⅆ𝑡
= ⅈ(𝐸𝑚 − 𝐸𝑛)𝐴𝑚𝑛 = ⅈ𝐸𝑚𝐴𝑚𝑛 − ⅈ𝐸𝑛𝐴𝑚𝑛 . 
Which, introducing the Hamiltonian operator H for total energy, can be stated as: 
ⅆ𝐴
ⅆ𝑡
= ⅈ(𝐻𝐴 − 𝐴𝐻) = ⅈ𝐻𝐴 − ⅈ𝐴𝐻. 
From the above equations it can be seen that A, as a function of time, remains constant 
to the value given by its initial state. Recognizing this, the complete formulation of 
Heisenberg’s equation of motion can be given as a commutation relation: 
 
14 Notations n and m refer to different eigenvalues of energy. 
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ⅆ𝐴
ⅆ𝑡
= ⅈℏ[𝐻, 𝐴] +  
∂𝐴
∂𝑡
, 
where the partial derivative term is for operators that have direct time dependence in 
addition to the time evolution of the operators in the commutator. 
 
II.II.III. THE COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION AND RECEIVED VIEW OF 
QUANTUM THEORY 
 
As previously presented, the two different pictures of quantum theory presented here 
(wave and matrix mechanics) involve different mathematical frameworks from which 
the same experimental results can be derived15. Due to the uncertainty principle, wave-
particle dualism and quantization of measured states, the early years of quantum theory 
involved fundamental and philosophical discussion regarding the correct ontological 
attitudes taken towards the new phenomena and theories about them. The topic of this 
discussion came to be called the “interpretations” of quantum mechanics. Early on, the 
received view formed around the views of Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg (as well 
as Max Born) in the latter part of the 1920s. This framework would come to be called 
the “Copenhagen interpretation”16. However, after a significant amount of literature 
written on the subject in the course of the 20th century, the term cannot be treated as 
well-defined: a multitude of often-conflicting stances in the context of interpretations of 
quantum mechanics have been presented that are categorized under “Copenhagen” 
(Faye 2019, 8). 
In order to preserve accuracy, the fundamental ideas shared by both Bohr and 
Heisenberg shall be treated as the “Copenhagen interpretation” in this thesis. The 
textbook “The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory” (Heisenberg, 1930) will be 
used as the primary source. It’s also important to note that areas where Bohr and 
Heisenberg disagreed will not be included here. 
One of Heisenberg's goals in the book was to “contribute somewhat to the diffusion of 
that Kopenhagener Geist der Quantentheorie” (Heisenberg 1930, preface). Thus, even 
though the aim here is to provide a systematic and tangible view of the stances in the 
 
15 It needs to be stated that both wave- and matrix mechanics have equivalent empirical content. 
Moreover, the systems are mutually isomorphic (von Neumann 1932, 17—27). 
16 The term “Copenhagen interpretation” was later coined by Heisenberg while criticizing alternative 
interpretations. (Kragh 1999, 210.) 
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Copenhagen interpretation, the origin of the term refers more to a general spirit than a 
defined ruleset. 
For Heisenberg, one of the fundamental notions regarding the uncertainty principle is 
that the wave-particle-duality, as seen in the classic experiments, appears as physical 
because of the limitations of language. Because language has evolved to describe and 
interact with everyday experiences, it is in pains attempting a description of more 
intricate atomic processes. This has to do, as well, with the notion of mental images: as 
Heisenberg argues, the language we use to describe phenomena constructs a mental 
picture of the physical system in question. Due to the limitations of language, these 
pictures have their limitations as well – resulting in the limited and contextual use of 
both wave- and particle pictures, depending on their applicability. Fortunately, 
mathematics is not as hindered by these limitations; and thus, the quantum theory can be 
presented as complete in its mathematical form. Heisenberg writes (Heisenberg 1930, 
10): 
The solution of the difficulty is that the two mental pictures which 
experiments lead us to form – the one of particles, and the other of waves 
– are both incomplete and have only the validity of analogies which are 
accurate only in limiting cases. It is a trite saying that “analogies cannot be 
pushed too far”, yet they may be justifiably used to describe things for 
which our language has no words. 
Heisenberg, in discussing quantum statistics, presents a good heuristic map of strengths 
and weaknesses of two opposing stances regarding quantum phenomena (Heisenberg 
1930, 65). One of the fundamental differences of quantum statistics, as opposed to 
classical statistical physics, is that the fundamental notion of causality is lost, as long as 
referring to spacetime phenomena is prioritized. This is because of the uncertainty 
principle (which will be addressed in greater detail briefly): as position and momentum 
are complementary, no measurement can be made to confirm a definite causal history 
for either (a definite causal history would require a simultaneous measurement of both 
quantities). It is, however, possible to describe causal relationships by means of the 
mathematics of quantum mechanics, but in this case reference to physical spacetime has 
to be abandoned.  
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Figure 1: Heisenberg's illustration of statistical alternatives (Heisenberg 1930, 65). 
Further, in Heisenberg’s view, it is meaningless to discuss probabilities in quantum 
statistics without reference to the experiments producing the probability distributions. 
This is to say that one cannot, in principle, separate the measured system from the 
measuring device. For quantum statistics, this maxim entails that any values given by a 
mathematical apparatus, without being directly related to experimental phenomena, 
have no physical reference. Heisenberg writes (Heisenberg 1930, 57): 
The statistical relation by means of probability coefficients is determined 
by the disturbance of the system produced by the measuring apparatus. 
Unless this disturbance is produced, there is no significance to be given 
the terms “value” or “probable” value of a variable in a given direction of 
unitary space which is not parallel to a principal axis of the corresponding 
tensor. Thus one becomes entangled in contradictions if one speaks of the 
probable position of the electron without considering the experiment used 
to determine it. 
While a restriction on the significances of statistical variables, this passage is 
representative of the general idea of the “Copenhagen spirit” – unobserved quantities or 
qualities, generally, cannot have a physical significance. 
 
II.II.III.I. THE UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE 
 
As discussed under the section on matrix mechanics, central to the limitations posed by 
the particle and wave pictures of quantum mechanics is the uncertainty principle. For 
the proponents of the Copenhagen spirit, the principle is to be treated as fundamental, 
and not as a contingent limitation of experimental apparatuses.17 Although already laid 
 
17 There is a connection to Bohm’s thinking here – more on this in III.III. 
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out in the context of canonical commutation relations, a more physical exposition of the 
principle will be presented here. 
The uncertainty principle states that the position and momentum of a particle cannot be 
simultaneously known with arbitrary accuracy. Here “position” is a localization of a 
wave packet. If the position of a particle is known at a certain accuracy 𝛥𝑥, then 𝛥𝑥 
corresponds to the extension of the wave packet. A wave packet, in contrast to a wave, 
refers to a wavelike disturbance, which has a non-zero amplitude only in a bounded 
region, regardless of its physical nature. The wave packet moves through space with 
velocity 𝑣, but this cannot be accurately defined because of the diffusion of the wave 
packet. (Heisenberg 1930, 13.)  
Because momentum in the x-axis is 𝑝𝑥 = 𝑚𝑣𝑥, the uncertainty 𝛥𝑣𝑥 in velocity causes 
the similar uncertainty 𝛥𝑝𝑥 for momentum. As the smallest possible extension of the 
wave packet corresponds to its wavelength 𝜆, and we already have established the 
relation18: 
𝜆 =
ℎ
𝑝
 
we are able to derive the original uncertainty relation19: 
𝛥𝑥𝛥𝑝𝑥 ≥ ℎ 
It is useful to note here that a more general expression of the uncertainty relation in 
physics is written in terms of standard deviations of position and momentum (Kennard, 
1927): 
𝜎𝑥𝜎𝑝 ≥
ℏ
2
, 
which is equivalently true for observations of the electron. Accordingly, the uncertainty 
relation can also be stated, and derived, without reference to a wave picture. 
(Heisenberg 1930, 15–20.) 
 
 
18 See page 10. 
19 The difference between the terms "uncertainty relation" and "uncertainty principle" is that the former 
refers to a mathematical relation, and the latter to a physical principle that is derived from the former. 
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II.II.III.II. LIMITATIONS OF THE WAVE AND PARTICLE PICTURES 
 
The uncertainty principle is the baseline for sketching the borders where the treatment 
of electrons as localized point masses can be applied. From the relations presented 
above, it is already clear that 𝛥𝑥𝛥𝑝 has a limit of accuracy – a limit on how localized 
our knowledge of the electron’s state can be at a given time 𝑡. It is important to notice 
that the uncertainty principle says nothing about the history of the electron. 
Accordingly, singular measurements of either position or momentum can be carried out 
with arbitrary accuracy. Heisenberg clarifies: 
Thus suppose that the velocity of a free electron is precisely known, while 
the position is completely unknown. Then the principle states that every 
subsequent observation of the position will alter the momentum by an 
unknown and undeterminable amount such that after carrying out the 
experiment our knowledge of the electronic motion is restricted by the 
uncertainty relation. (Heisenberg 1930, 20) 
In this situation, the history of the electron may be calculated, in order to get a 
theoretical model of both position and momentum of all points of time preceding the 
measurement. But as every measurement affects the system, this knowledge cannot be 
used to predict the electron’s location at points 𝑡 + Δ𝑡. As the history of the electron 
cannot be used to predict its future, it remains speculative in character:20 
It is a matter of personal belief whether such a calculation concerning the 
past history of the electron can be ascribed any physical reality or not. 
(Heisenberg 1930, 21.) 
Heisenberg presents several experimental examples to illustrate the unavoidability of 
the restrictions the uncertainty relation imposes on the particle picture. I will discuss 
two of these restrictions. To begin with, we have the simple example of position 
determination by a microscope. The resolution of any microscope is determined by  
𝛥𝑥 =
𝜆
sin 𝜖
, 
where the term 𝜖 denotes the angular opening of the light cone, imposed by the 
microscope from a given distance. For the microscope to detect the electron, at least one 
photon must hit the electron, and travel through the microscope to the observer. Because 
the direction of the scattered photon is undetermined, the recoil received by the electron 
 
20 Claims that some experiments bring forth this history, especially in the context of so-called weak 
measurements, have been made. However, these kinds of claims are inaccurate if a violation of the 
uncertainty principle is implied. See e.g. Kastner, 2017.  
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is accordingly undetermined. Thus, at the immediate moment when the measurement is 
made, the uncertainty relation (for the electron’s momentum in the x-axis) 𝛥𝑥𝛥𝑝𝑥~ℎ 
kicks in.21 
The classic single-slit experiment is an attempt to avert wave properties in 
experimentation. In the experiment, photons are fired in the x-axis through a slit of 
length ⅆ in the y-axis. Assuming that the situation is two-dimensional, and the electrons 
have no momentum in the y-direction, the uncertainty of the electrons' positions in the 
y-axis after passing through the slit is known to be Δ𝑦 = ⅆ, while the equation 𝑝𝑦 = 0 
should still hold for momentum. But, as the electrons behave as de Broglie matter 
waves, they are diffracted when passing through the slit. This creates momentum in the 
y-direction, which is uncertain by the amount 
𝛥𝑝𝑦 =
ℎ
𝜆
sin 𝛼, 
where sin 𝛼 ~ 𝜆/ⅆ is the angle of divergence of the beam having passed the slit. From 
this we get the uncertainty relation once more. (Heisenberg 1930, 21–24) 
As with the particle picture, quantum mechanics imposes non-classical limitations to the 
use of the wave picture accordingly. Heisenberg notes that it is important to understand 
that notions of wave amplitude refer to abstractions, while their physical observations 
are always average values over a small region of space of volume 𝛿𝑉. Depending on the 
measuring instrument, the size of the volume may be reduced up to a point. However, 
the field strengths of waves of wavelength much less than 𝛿𝑙 (the one-dimensional 
extension of the region) will not be detected. By diminishing the size of 𝛿𝑉, however, a 
contradiction with the particle picture seemingly arises.  
As, in a three-dimensional case, the energy and momentum of the measured wave are 
given by 
𝐸 = 𝛿𝑉
1
8𝜋
(?⃗?2 + ?⃗⃗?2),  ?⃗? = 𝛿𝑉
1
4𝜋𝑐
?⃗⃗? × ?⃗?, 
where the values ?⃗? and ?⃗⃗? are the field strengths in both axes perpendicular to velocity, 
the amplitudes could be measured in arbitrary accuracy by diminishing 𝛿𝑉. However, 
we know for quantization of radiation that the values are made of finite packets of 
magnitude 𝐸𝑛 = ℎ𝑣 and ?⃗?𝑛 = ℎ𝑣/𝑐. This leads to uncertainty of precisely the 
 
21 The Compton scattering has momentum of magnitude ℎ ∕ 𝑝. 
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magnitude of the packets as the minimum threshold for the volume. The values ?⃗? and ?⃗⃗? 
have thus an uncertainty relation, which produces uncertainties for 𝐸 and ?⃗? by: 
𝛥𝐸 =
ℎ𝑐
𝛿𝑙
, 𝛥?⃗? =
ℎ
𝛿𝑙
. 
Depending on the distributions and strengths of the fields, the expectation values for the 
amplitudes ?⃗? and ?⃗⃗? can be zero as well. Thus, the displacements Δ?⃗? and Δ?⃗⃗? have to 
themselves bring about the aforementioned uncertainty for energy and momentum. 
From this we get the relation: 
𝛥?⃗?𝛥?⃗⃗? ≥
ℎ𝑐
𝛿𝑉𝛿𝑙
=
ℎ𝑐
(𝛿𝑙)4
 
Although this treatment considers electromagnetic waves and their Maxwell equations, 
the same relations hold equivalently for de Broglie matter waves. (Heisenberg 1930, 48–
51.)  
 
II.II.III.III. METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The Copenhagen spirit is intimately related, as mentioned before, to the early 
discussion of quantum mechanics with methodological principles and the philosophy of 
science. At the very centre of this discussion is the concept of wave-particle duality. The 
idea of duality in matter first arose in de Broglie’s seminal work regarding matter waves 
in 1924. The de Broglie hypothesis was proven to be correct, but the physical nature of 
the wave and particle pictures was left unclear, as they were initially seen as 
contradictory at the fundamental level of nature. As discussed in this chapter, the 
contradiction arises at the limit of accuracy determined by the uncertainty relations 
because it is not consistent for physical entities to simultaneously be described by wave- 
and particle pictures.22 However, as a solution, de Broglie proposed the idea of a pilot 
wave in 1927, which, roughly put, suggests that a wave is associated with the particle, 
as a separate entity, guiding the motion of the particle (hence the title). The pilot wave 
theory provides a heuristic basis for the more advanced de Broglie-Bohm interpretation, 
which will be discussed in greater detail later. 
 
22 To clarify this somewhat, one can, for example, think of a ball at the end of a spring, undergoing 
sinusoidal motion. It is clear enough that we can observe a physical body in wavelike motion, but the 
physical natures of both the body and its motion are well-defined and separate notions. No such 
distinction can be made for electrons, as the particle cannot be localized without destroying other 
knowledge of it (such as momentum). 
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For Heisenberg, the duality problem requires no such solutions, but a well-defined 
understanding of the limits for both, which have been discussed above. Heisenberg 
(1930, 47) writes: 
After a critique of the wave concept has been added to that of the particle 
concept all contradictions between the two disappear – provided only that 
due regard is paid to the limits of applicability of the two pictures. 
This statement is correct for applications of physics: all contradictions can be avoided as 
long as the lower limit of accuracy is included.23 However, early on, this attitude was 
not adopted by all; one of the most famous examples is the Bohr-Einstein debates of 
1927–1935. In the wake of the “quantum revolution”, Einstein was dissatisfied with the 
epistemology of the Copenhagen spirit. This led to a prolonged debate between Einstein 
and Bohr regarding the epistemic and methodological constraints of quantum theory.24 
For Einstein, the primary task of physics was to give a detailed account of any physical 
process, which he strongly felt quantum mechanics did not achieve. This led him to call 
the theory incomplete. As was already established by 1927, the uncertainty relation was 
ascertained as an unavoidable and fundamental attribute of all formalisms of quantum 
theory. Because the uncertainty principle restricts a causal25 account of particle systems 
in spacetime, Einstein sought, by means of thought experiments, to find alternative 
ways to get past the limitations of the principle. In his reply to Bohr’s account, Einstein 
states his general attitude towards the epistemology of quantum theory: 
What does not satisfy me in that theory, from the standpoint of principle, 
is its attitude towards that which appears to me to be the programmatic 
aim of all physics: the complete description of any (individual) real 
situation (as it supposedly exists irrespective of any act of observation or 
substantiation). Whenever the positivistically inclined modern physicist 
hears such a formulation his reaction is that of a pitying smile. He says to 
himself: "there we have the naked formulation of a metaphysical 
prejudice, empty of content, a prejudice, moreover, the conquest of which 
constitutes the major epistemological achievement of physicists within the 
last quarter-century. Has any man ever perceived a 'real physical 
situation'? How is it possible that a reasonable person could today still 
believe that he can refute our essential knowledge and understanding by 
drawing up such a bloodless ghost?" (Schlipp et. al. 1949, 667.) 
 
23 For instance, the uncertainty principle sets the lower limit for the size and density of semiconductors. 
24 The content of the debates is documented in Bohr’s report in Einstein’s volume of the Library of Living 
Philosophers (Schlipp et al. 1949) and in Zurek & Wheeler (eds.) 1983. 
25 For physicists widely and in general, the notion of causality is used in a quite restricted sense. Here, as 
“causal”, only complete and certain accounts of both momentum and position at all points of spacetime 
apply. The notion itself will be discussed in more depth later. 
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First of Einstein’s thought experiments was a modification to the already familiar single 
and double slit experiments. The diaphragm, which contains the slit the electrons are 
fired through, could be made to move freely with an instrument measuring its 
movement. Thus, the momentum transferred to the incoming wave packet could be 
measured by measuring the dislocation of the diaphragm, while knowing that the 
electron’s position at that time is within the constraints of the slit. However, Bohr 
pointed out that problems would follow for the measurement of the diaphragm. If the 
momentum of the diaphragm is measured with great accuracy, its position will be 
unknown due to the uncertainty principle. And, naturally, if the diaphragm is fixed, no 
momentum measurement (to obtain information of the particle’s momentum) can be 
executed. 
Heisenberg points this out as well in “Physical Principles” as he discusses an 
experiment for detecting an electron passing through a cone of photons of a microscope. 
If the microscope could move, the momentum of the incoming photon could be 
measured, but (Heisenberg 1930, 22): 
[…]this does not circumvent the uncertainty relation, for it immediately 
raises questions of the position of the microscope, and its position and 
momentum will also be found to be subject to equation [𝛥𝑝𝑥𝛥𝑥~ℎ]. The 
position of the microscope need not be considered if the electron and a 
fixed scale be simultaneously observed through the moving microscope, 
and this seems to afford an escape from the uncertainty principle. But an 
observation then requires the simultaneous passage of at least two light 
quanta through the microscope to the observer – one from the electron and 
one from the scale – and a measurement of the recoil of the microscope is 
no longer sufficient to determine the direction of the light scattered by the 
electron. And so on ad infinitum. 
Another challenge was presented by Einstein at the sixth Solvay conference in 1930. 
There he proposed that the mass-energy relations of relativity theory (𝐸 = 𝑚𝑐2) could 
be used to circumvent the uncertainty principle. The argument is as follows: if a box, 
containing radiation, and having a shutter attached to a clock of extreme accuracy which 
controls the opening and closing of the shutter, then the shutter could be applied to 
release a single photon from the box. If the box were weighed on an accurate scale 
immediately before and after the action of the shutter, both the location (at the shutter) 
and the momentum (from the mass difference of the box) of the photon could be known 
for a point of time of accuracy in contradiction with the uncertainty relation. The 
system, as presented by Bohr (1949), is of the kind pictured: 
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Figure 2: The Einstein particle-in-a-box experiment (Schlipp et. al. 1949, 227) 
The scale function in the picture is performed by the system of a weak spring and a 
measuring scale with a corresponding pointer. The counterargument to this thought 
experiment, as presented by Bohr, is the following: to obtain greater accuracy from the 
mass measurement, one must also allow for a greater time interval for the measuring 
instrument (in this case, spring) to balance. Moreover, due to the equivalent time 
dilation effects of acceleration and gravity, a clock experiencing an acceleration due to 
the displacement of the box will have a differing reading when compared to the rest 
state. The difference in reading is in accordance to the time interval T required for the 
balancing of the scale by an amount of Δ𝑇. The time dilation effect is then given by 
𝛥𝑇
𝑇
=
1
𝑐2
𝑔𝛥𝑞, 
where g is the gravitational constant and 𝛥𝑞 the displacement of the scale reading. After 
the weighing procedure there will be an uncertainty in the clock reading of amount 
𝛥𝑇 >
ℎ
𝑐2𝛥𝑚
, 
and combining this with 𝐸 = 𝑚𝑐2 we get the uncertainty relation between time and 
energy (Schlipp et. al., 228): 
𝛥𝑇𝛥𝐸 > ℎ. 
The particular experiments in the examples above have the same general property: the 
measuring instrument cannot be separated from the object of experimentation. This is a 
more accurate way of stating the uncertainty principle than that the measuring device 
always disturbs the object. Because there is no way of meaningfully speaking about 
experimental results without the instruments carrying out the observations, it has to be 
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accepted that whatever instruments that are used cannot be distinguished from their 
targets in terms of physical phenomena. This matter of phrasing was recognized as 
important by Bohr, as he stated (Schlipp et. al. 1949, 237): 
In this connection I warned especially against phrases, often found in the 
physical literature, such as disturbing of phenomena by observation or 
“creating physical attributes to atomic objects by measurements”. Such 
phrases, which may serve to remind of the apparent paradoxes in quantum 
theory, are at the same time apt to cause confusion, since words like 
“phenomena” and “observations”, just as “attributes and “measurements”, 
are used in a way hardly compatible with common language and practical 
definition. 
As a more appropriate way of expression, I advocated the application of 
the word “phenomenon” exclusively to refer to the observations obtained 
under specified circumstances, including an account of the whole 
experimental arrangement. 
However, even with the above specification, the discussion regarding these experiments 
might still give rise to a confusion of quantum theory: such that the uncertainty relations 
were caused by the introduction of experimental instruments. In order to avoid such a 
confusion, it is best to sternly emphasize the role of the uncertainty relations as the 
fundamental notion of quantum theory. As discussed, the formalization of quantum 
theory under matrix mechanics rests on the axiom of canonical commutation relations; 
if they did not hold, neither would the theory work. To shine as much light onto the 
situation as possible, recall the Hamiltonian equation of motion: 
ⅆ𝐴
ⅆ𝑡
= ⅈℏ[𝐻, 𝐴] +  
∂𝐴
∂𝑡
, 
which is a canonical commutation relation directly encompassing the uncertainty. 
Mathematically, the derivation of the equation involves assigning operators A for an 
observable a (e.g. position) and E for energy. The commutator ⅈℏ[𝐻, 𝐴] is then an 
expression of the Schrödinger equation. It trivially expands to 
ⅈℏ(𝐻𝐴 − 𝐴𝐻), 
which, if the order of operation were arbitrary for all H and A, would result to zero, 
signifying no action in all possible cases. Thus, if the uncertainty principle did not hold, 
quantum mechanics would be rendered useless. 
The situation is no different for other (physically equivalent) pictures, i.e. wave 
mechanics. As stated by Heisenberg (e.g. in his 1930, 13–19), the uncertainty 
necessarily follows from the wave-particle duality. Recall that a particle has to be 
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treated as a wave packet, and that amplitudes of a wave cannot be measured in an 
arbitrarily small region due to quantization. Therefore, the uncertainty relations lie 
under all properties of quantum-mechanical systems. A perhaps more rhetorically 
effective, and still as accurate, way of stating the same fact is: either the uncertainty 
principle holds, and atoms are stable (due to quantization of orbits), or atoms are not 
stable, given that their orbits would not be quantized (it’s perhaps best to emphasize that 
this by itself does not provide an explanation for the lowest orbit, just that without it 
quantum theory would fall apart). 
One further way of illustrating this unavoidability is to consider once again the 
diaphragm and the photographic plate. The diaphragm in this case has two slits, and the 
photographic plate once again receives the electrons fired through the slits. The 
experiment is conducted so that only one electron is fired at a time. Then, by repeated 
iterations, it is confirmed that single electrons obey the diffraction pattern caused by the 
colliding wavefronts incoming from both slits. For any epistemic26 purpose, the only 
way to model the phenomena that is restricted to observed phenomena omits histories of 
the electron. The consequence of this is that the mathematical structure of such a model 
inevitably gives rise to the notions of ‘superposition’ and ‘collapse’, if such were to be 
discussed. This makes the set of uncertainty relations a kind of a physical principle, 
because there is no way to derive from observations a concept that would track a single 
path for the electron.2728 
Regardless, these thought experiments were not the last objections raised to the 
Copenhagen spirit. The third important challenge was presented by Einstein, Podolsky 
and Rosen in their 1935 paper “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical 
Reality Be Considered Complete?”. The paper included a property between two 
particles originating from the same system that came to be called the Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen paradox, or more briefly, the EPR paradox. To understand the paradox better, a 
quick look to many particle quantum mechanics is required. 
The fundamentals of many-particle mechanics are consistent with the quantum-
mechanical formalism of single-particle systems. The state vector |𝜓⟩ is taken as the 
 
26 Typically, objections to statements such as these are ontological (i.e. argumentation beyond empirical 
observation) – which will be discussed shortly. 
27 For further discussion, see e.g. Busch, Heinonen and Lahti (2006). 
28 The idea that this is in principle impossible is refuted by the proponents of the de Broglie-Bohm 
interpretation, and it is indeed possible to simulate the individual electron tracks as will be shown in the 
next chapter. However, all agree that no measurement exists (as of yet, at the very least) for the individual 
paths. 
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general description of the state of any system. Any single particle is associated with the 
Hilbert space ℋ, which describes the abstract space elements of which correspond to 
the possible values of the system. To describe a system of two particles with the state 
vector |𝜓⟩, we begin by denoting the combined product space of its subspaces ℋ1 and 
ℋ2 by: 
ℋ12 = ℋ1 ⊗ ℋ2 
From each pair of state vectors, say,  
|𝜓⟩(1) ∈  ℋ1 and |𝜓⟩
(2) ∈ ℋ2 
we can construct the combined state vector as a direct product state: 
|𝜓, 𝜙⟩ ≡ |𝜓⟩(1) ⊗ |𝜓⟩(2) = |𝜓⟩(1)|𝜓⟩(2) ∈ ℋ12 
This state, as it is a direct product state, can be divided (i.e. factored) into its respective 
substates (i.e. the states of individual particles). The state space ℋ12 consists of all 
direct product states of ℋ1 and ℋ2 as well as all possible linear combinations of these. 
As an illumination, the Schrödinger equation of N particles can be constructed 
straightforwardly as: 
ⅈℏ
ⅆ
ⅆ𝑡
|𝜓⟩ = 𝐻|𝜓⟩ 
⇒ 𝐻 = ∑
𝑃𝑎
2
2𝑚𝑎
𝑁
𝑎=1
+ 𝑉(?̅?𝑁), 
where ?̅?𝑁 is simply the position vector series of N particles in the state Hilbert space 
ℋ𝑁. 
However, the combined state space can also include states which are not direct product 
states – states that cannot be factored into states of separate subspaces. These states are 
called entangled states, which can only be represented in the combined space. In 
physical terms, this means that if a system of two or more particles is in such a state, the 
state of a single particle cannot be represented by a consideration of the single particle 
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(of that system) alone. Entangled states are described by the formal definition (for pure 
states29): 
∄{|𝜓⟩(1) ∈  ℋ1, |𝜓⟩
(2) ∈ ℋ2}   𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡   |𝜓⟩ = |𝜓⟩
(1) ⊗ |𝜓⟩(2)  
The above definition is a negative one30; it says that whenever there aren’t direct 
product states that can be factored into these two subspaces, the state is entangled. To be 
emphasized here is that the volume of direct product states compared to entangled states 
diminishes as the complexity of the system increases, which is to say that separable 
states are generally a special set (see figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Graph of the volume of separable states as a function of the number of 
subsystems (Zyczkowski, Horodecki, Sanpera and Lewenstein, 1998.) 
The EPR argument considers a bipartite (two-particle) system, in which the particles 
interact in the interval 𝑡 + 𝛥𝑡 = 𝑇, and are in no interaction in times > 𝑇. The states of 
both systems before 𝑡 are known. Now, assume that we are experimentally interested of 
only one physical quantity, for example A, and its respective eigenvalues 𝑎𝑛. The state 
of neither system after 𝑇 cannot be calculated, but it has to be subjected to further 
measurements, causing the wave function to collapse. Mathematically, the state after T 
but before observation can be expressed as the infinite series  
|𝜓⟩ = ∑ 𝜓𝑁(𝑥2)𝑢𝑁(𝑥1)
∞
𝑁=1
, 
 
29 This is the definition of pure entangled states. Pure states are a property of a system isolated from its 
surroundings. This is an idealization, since this is impossible for almost all quantum systems. In the 
majority of cases we consider mixed states where the formalism includes the traces of the systems 
environment. For the purposes of simplicity, however, we consider pure states here whenever possible. 
30 Naturally, an equivalent positive definition exists. 
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where the terms 𝜓𝑁(𝑥2) function as coefficients for the expansion of 𝜓 into orthogonal 
functions 𝑢𝑁(𝑥1), and generally the two wavefunctions represent the states of respective 
particles. The 𝑥 describe the range of variables of the wavefunctions. After observation 
of A, the superposition of the quantity collapses into a definite state 𝑎𝑘, and the two 
wavefunctions are represented by 
𝜓𝑘(𝑥2)𝑢𝑘(𝑥1). 
Suppose now that instead of A, the quantity B should be measured instead (in an 
otherwise identical situation). Because the observed eigenvalues 𝑏𝑛 are similarly the 
result of their respective wavefunctions, the measurement causes a wavefunction 
collapse into different definite functions, say 
𝜙𝑟(𝑥2)𝜑𝑟(𝑥1). 
To be clear, this relation holds when just one of the two systems is measured. Now, 
suppose that two consequential observations are executed for one system, first for 
quantity A and then B. As long as the two systems no longer interact, this should mean 
that the other system is now described by two different wavefunctions. Furthermore, 
suppose that these two quantities were, for example, the position and momentum 
operators ?̂? and ?̂? which should not commute. For Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, this 
seemed to provide a way of defining a physical reality to the elements of both ?̂? and ?̂?, 
establishing that quantum mechanics is not a complete description of physical reality. 
(Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen 1935.) 
In the interest of time, the historical discussion regarding the paradox between Einstein 
and Bohr is skipped over, and instead the conclusive reason of why this does not work 
is shown. The EPR argument supposes a postulate of many-particle systems that can be 
called the “local hidden variable model” (LHVM). This supposition is that after 
interaction, the two or more particles involved in the interaction assume hidden 
variables that determine the states of the collapsed wavefunctions. Because interaction 
can supposedly only be local, the information gained from the two measurements of the 
first particle also provides information of the second particle without disturbing it.  
The problem here is that the entangled states discussed earlier are defined by their direct 
violation of LHVM, as the definition of entanglement is the impossibility of 
factorization of the quantum state to its subsystems. There are two other options: if the 
states are separable, they are (i) either non-entangled states without local interaction 
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(where no information of other systems relevant to this situation is attainable by 
measurements of one), or (ii) non-entangled states with local interaction with each 
other, where the measurement is once again a part of the total system. Naturally, this 
information regarding entangled states was not available in 1935. The contemporary 
understanding was developed first by Bell in his (1964) where a set of inequalities, later 
named the Bell inequalities, were derived from the LHVM assumption. These 
inequalities were shown to be inconsistent with the predictions of quantum mechanics. 
Later, the predictions in question were shown to be empirically correct by Clauser and 
Freedman in 1972 and Aspect, Dalibard and Roger in 1984, killing the idea of local 
hidden variables. 
One question of interest since the discovery of entanglement has been the nature of 
interaction between particles in entanglement but not in local interaction, as it raises 
questions about violations of relativity theory and conservation of energy. However, it 
is commonly agreed that no signal (defined as transmitting and receiving information) is 
transmitted between the subsystems, as causally manipulating the states of the systems 
is impossible.31 (E.g. Popescu and Rohrlich 1997, Peres and Terno 2004.) 
As a closing remark regarding the disagreements between Einstein and “those of the 
Copenhagen spirit”, the nature of the argumentation was categorically epistemological 
or methodological, and thus strictly in the domain of physics as a first-order scientific 
enterprise. Einstein’s pursuit was to use thought experiments to come up with 
experimental arrangements that could circumvent the uncertainty principle. Had these 
worked, the process would have been a part of development of physics by the means of 
novel empirical discoveries. The nature of argumentation for interpretations that were 
to follow, as the reader will come to see, is different – and generally better classifiable 
under the category of philosophy of physics. 
 
31 This is the content of the so-called “no-communication theorem”. However, whether a signal is 
transmitted between entangled systems can also be argued to be a matter of definition. If interaction of 
any kind, a category that includes entanglement, is defined to necessitate signalling, then, conceptually, 
signals are transmitted between entangled systems. However, this is a trivial point to make for all 
practical purposes, as the possibility of communication by means of entanglement remains barren. For 
further discussion, see Walleczek & Grössing 2016. 
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III. THE DE BROGLIE-BOHM INTERPRETATION 
III.I. EARLY DEVELOPMENT 
 
The discovery of matter waves in 1924 by Louis de Broglie led him to sketch out a 
model of the quantum system where a separation between a wave and a particle is 
maintained. This was to be called the “pilot wave theory”. Its core property is that at any 
time, a particle is accompanied by a guiding wave.  
Initially, de Broglie published the idea of the pilot wave in his 1927 paper “‘Wave 
mechanics and the atomic structure of matter and of radiation”. However, the pilot 
wave was presented by de Broglie as a provisional theory as an alternative to another of 
his postulates. To summarize the paper, de Broglie begins by treating particles 
described by the wave function as singularities in a wave field 𝑢(?̅?, 𝑡). The motion of 
the particle is given by a Klein-Gordon equation of a wave u: 
𝛻2𝑢 −
1
𝐶2
𝜕2𝑢
𝜕𝑡2
=
4𝜋2𝑣0
2
𝑐2
𝑢, 
which is a variant of the Schrödinger equation describing the relativistic motion of 
bosons. The solution de Broglie proposes is of the form 
𝑢(?̅?, 𝑡) = 𝑓(?̅? − ?̅?𝑡) 𝑐𝑜𝑠
2𝜋
ℎ
𝜙(?̅?, 𝑡), 
where f denotes the amplitude of the wave. At the location ?̅? = ?̅?𝑡 the amplitude is 
singular (i.e. at this point we find a discontinuity in the wave). The phase of the wave, 
𝜙(?̅?, 𝑡), is given by 
𝜙(?̅?, 𝑡) =
ℎ𝑣0
√1 −
𝑣2
𝑐1
(𝑡 −
?̅? ⋅ ?̅?
𝑐2
) 
which is equivalent with the Hamiltonian representation of the Schrödinger equation. In 
other words, here we find the system described in terms of phase and velocity instead of 
total energies. Now, de Broglie argues that for an ensemble of particles, the preceding 
can be represented as a continuous equation 
𝜓(?̅?, 𝑡) = 𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑠
2𝜋
ℎ
𝜙(?̅?, 𝑡), 
where a remains constant. Having given these for the cases of free particles, de Broglie 
considers particles in an external potential, where the Klein-Gordon equation is 
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expressed in a complex form accordingly to the Schrödinger equation. Here, what needs 
to be solved is the extension of the phase 𝜙 to cases where the external potential is non-
zero. Solving for the associated differential equation, and generalizing the phase as 
𝜙(?̅?, 𝑡) = 𝐸𝑡 − 𝜙1(?̅?), 
 
𝜙1 being the time-independent phase function, one of the solutions then becomes 
ℏ
⊡ 𝑓
𝑓
= (𝛻𝜙1) −
1
𝑐2
(𝐸 − 𝑉)2 + 𝑚0
2𝑐2, 
where 
⊡=  𝛻2 −
1
𝑐2
𝜕2
𝜕𝑡2
. 
What needs to be accounted for here is the relation between the terms 𝑓 and 𝜙1, i.e. the 
relation between the velocity of the singularity and the phase of the wave. In the 
classical limit, the directions of the velocity and the phase vector are equal. The 
“quantum effects” demonstrated by the uncertainty relations arise when the term ⊡ 𝑓 is 
non-zero; de Broglie postulates that the equality remains unaltered in these cases as 
well. 
After this treatment of singularities in an external potential, de Broglie proceeds to 
discuss continuous waves in the similar case. Here, de Broglie derives from the 
associated motion equation the solution 
ℏ2
𝛻2𝑎
𝑎
= (𝛻𝜙1
′ )2 −
1
𝑐2
(𝐸 − 𝑉) + 𝑚0
2𝑐2, 
which shares the same form with the singular equation. Of these two, de Broglie 
proposes that the phase functions 𝜙1 and 𝜙1
′  are always equal, leading into a so-called 
“double solution”: equal solutions to the Klein-Gordon equation describing both 
singular and continuous waves. To be stressed here is that two critical assumptions have 
been made: one of the generality of the relation between the vectors of velocity and 
phase inside a classical limit, and one of the equality of phases of singular and 
continuous waves. Generalizing the solutions to a charge in a time-dependent 
electromagnetic field, with these assumptions, de Broglie presents the general 
expression for the velocity of the particle: 
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?̅? = −𝑐2
𝛻𝜙 +
ⅇ
𝑐 ?̅?
?̇? − ⅇ𝜗
. 
Building from this, de Broglie proceeds onwards to give similar accounts by the double 
solution of cases with an external potential. Summarizing the steps that were to follow, 
the end game was to show that there exists a solution for the 6-dimensional phase 
function of two particles 𝜙(?̅?1, ?̅?2) such that a corresponding (generally well-defined) 
wave function 𝜓(?̅?1, ?̅?2, 𝑡) is satisfied. Due to an error in de Broglie’s argumentation 
and for the sake of brevity this will not be discussed further.  
However, in the latter part of the paper, de Broglie proposes an alternative approach to 
the above velocity equation. Instead of vindicating the expression of velocity by 
attempting to find a solution to the corresponding phase functions (invoking the double 
solution), the phase can be treated as a physically separate entity from the particle. 
Thus, the wave function, presented by de Broglie in the polar form 
𝜓(?̅?, 𝑡) = 𝑎(?̅?, 𝑡)ⅇ(ⅈ ℏ⁄ )𝜙(?̅?,𝑡), 
describes a continuous wave (described in the phase function) associated with a material 
point (described the position vector of the amplitude). This idea was extended by de 
Broglie at the 1927 Solvay conference, where he provided an account of the pilot wave 
theory for a many-body system. After giving the wave function and the phase for one 
particle exactly as in his recent paper, de Broglie went on to sketch the velocities of N 
particles by 
?̅?𝑘 = −
1
𝑚𝑘
𝛻𝑘𝜙, 
where the probability for the system to be in a volume element ⅆ𝜏 is 
𝜋 ⅆ𝜏 = 𝐶𝑎2 ⅆ𝜏, 
which is to say that the amplitude of the wave in a given volume element dictates the 
probability. As velocity is the fundamental variable for de Broglie’s theory, he 
generalized the classical Hamilton-Jacobi equation for this purpose. The particle 
trajectories are determined (causally)32 by initial conditions of the system; thus de 
 
32 By causality, de Broglie means a fully well-defined causation from initial conditions to positions (i.e. a 
relationship beyond the uncertainty principle). 
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Broglie argued that determinism should not be abandoned. (Bacciagaluppi & Valentini 
2009, 69—76). 
De Broglie’s presentation in 1927 is among the first times a differing conceptual 
interpretation of quantum mechanics was proposed.33 And later the “quantum Hamilton-
Jacobi” became central to the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation. Although de Broglie’s 
ideas were quickly rejected by the physics community at the time as speculative and 
irreconcilable with experimentation (Bacciagaluppi & Valentini 2009, 233—242), very 
similar ideas were (independently) brought up by David Bohm some twenty years later. 
To be emphasized, in any case, is the notion of interpreting quantum mechanics which 
became fundamental for the development of modern philosophy of physics. Unlike 
Einstein, de Broglie did not attempt to come up with experimental arrangements but 
rather derived and postulated mathematical structures which were then to be 
interpreted.34 
 
III.II. THE ONTOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 
 
As mentioned, similar ideas that were first presented by de Broglie were later 
independently picked up by David Bohm, leading to the publication of his 1952 article 
“A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in Terms of ‘Hidden’ Variables”. 
The ideas in the paper were further developed in his 1957 book “Causality and Chance 
in Modern Physics”. Later on Bohm collaborated with physicist Basil Hiley, resulting 
in their final book “The Undivided Universe” (1993). The theory underwent some 
changes in the decades in between, but for the purposes of this thesis, only the final 
theory, which Bohm and Hiley dubbed the “ontological interpretation of quantum 
theory”, will be discussed. The basics of the ontological interpretation are given a great 
deal of space here – this is because scrutinizing its properties is the point of this thesis.35 
 
33 Madelung (1926) proposed an alternative hydrodynamical formulation to the Schrödinger equation the 
year before. 
34 The possibility of an experiment, distinct from the predictions made by standard quantum mechanics, is 
one of the central points of contention between proponents of different interpretations and already 
introduced by Bohm in his 1952 paper (Bohm 1952a, 179). This theme will be discussed further in III.III. 
35 There has, naturally, been further discussion regarding the ontological interpretation and “Bohmian 
mechanics” in the years after 1993. There are also differences between the proponents of the de Broglie-
Bohm interpretation (see e.g. Holland 2014). The core ideas for the interpretation that are relevant for this 
thesis, however, remain sufficiently unchanged across time and authors. 
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For single-particle systems, Bohm and Hiley formulate the WKB approximation36 of the 
classical limit of quantum mechanics by writing the standard wave function in polar 
form 
𝜓 = 𝑅e(
ⅈ𝑆
ℏ ), 
where R and S are real functions. This is then inserted into the Schrödinger equation. 
The solutions for this are 
𝜕𝑆
𝜕𝑡
+
𝛻𝑆
2𝑚
+ 𝑉 −
ℏ2𝛻2𝑅
2𝑚𝑅
= 0 
and 
𝜕𝑅2
𝜕𝑡
+ 𝛻 ⋅ (𝑅2
𝛻𝑆
𝑚
) = 0 
of which the latter is the continuum equation (which ensures the conservation of 
probability) and the former is what Bohm and Hiley call “the quantum Hamilton-
Jacobi” equation. (Bohm & Hiley 1993, 28—30.) The key difference here to the 
standard WKB approximation in the classical limit is that the last term which is 
customarily neglected is instead preserved. Bohm & Hiley call this the quantum 
potential: 
𝑄 =  
ℏ2𝛻2𝑅
2𝑚𝑅
. 
Here, the term S is the phase of the system and 𝑅2 = 𝜌 (i.e. the probability density of a 
given point – as well as the amplitude of the quantum field). The quantum potential is a 
key concept in Bohm’s and Hiley’s thinking. It differs from the “classical” potential, V, 
because its effect to a given particle is mediated non-locally. Bohm and Hiley write: 
[T]he quantum potential is not changed when we multiply the field ψ by 
an arbitrary constant. (This is because ψ appears both in the numerator 
and the denominator of Q.) This means that the effect of the quantum 
potential is independent of the strength (i.e. the intensity) of the quantum 
field but depends only on its form. By contrast, classical waves, which act 
mechanically (i.e. to transfer energy and momentum, for example, to push 
a floating object), always produce effects that are more or less 
proportional to the wave. (Bohm & Hiley 1993, 31.) 
 
36 The WKB approximation (initialism for Wentzel—Kramers—Brillouin) is a method of approximating 
linear differential equations such as the Schrödinger equation. 
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With the concept of quantum potential, Bohm and Hiley flesh out their ontology for the 
quantum-mechanical system. The four main points are: 
OI1. The electron is, at all times, a particle, with a well-defined position 
which is causally determined. 
OI2. Its equation of motion is determined by Q as well as V. 
OI3. The wave function describes a quantum field which accompanies the 
particle at all times. 
OI4. The way the electron is coordinated is described by a guidance 
equation. 
The guidance equation gives the electron’s velocity in configuration space in respect to 
time-evolution. It is written as 
?⃗?(𝑟, 𝑡) =
𝛻𝑆(𝑟, 𝑡)
𝑚
, 
which is the evolution of phase in respect to time and position (Bohm 1952). 
This approach is similar to de Broglie’s alternative concept of the pilot wave. De 
Broglie’s idea was to avoid the issues relating to the (non-)correspondence of respective 
velocity and phase functions by treating the wave and the “material point” as distinct 
entities, and, in effect, that is exactly what’s being done here. 
Where Bohm and Hiley go further is fleshing out the mathematics and ontological 
implications based on this concept. Importantly, the causal relation between the 
quantum potential and the particle needs to be explained. This is done by introducing 
another new concept, active information. Basically, the quantum potential feeds a given 
particle instructions for operation, such as those determining position and momentum. 
The set of these instructions is the active information. It differs from the common usage 
of the term ‘information’ insofar that it does not need to refer to subjectivity, evidence 
or knowledge. Instead, it is meant to be taken in the literal sense ‘in-form’ – meaning 
that the potential gives the particles’ actions their form. The quantum potential, then, is 
not to be understood as a mechanical force: 
Although equation (3.8.)37 may look like a classical law implying pushing 
or pulling by the quantum potential, this would not be understandable 
because a very weak field can produce the full effect which depends only 
on the form of the wave. […] So the ability to do work does not originate 
in the quantum field, but must have some other origin[.] (Bohm & Hiley 
1993, 37.) 
 
37 𝑚
ⅆ𝑣
ⅆ𝑡
= −𝛻(𝑉) − 𝛻(𝑄) 
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The ‘active’ side comes from the idea that the information encompassed by the quantum 
potential becomes actually active when a particle is guided by this information and 
potentially active wherever the quantum potential is non-zero. How, then, can this 
information be processed? Bohm and Hiley suggest that active information implies 
some sort of inherent faculties for a particle, or a “complex inner structure”: 
The fact that the particle is moving under its own energy, but being guided 
by the information in the quantum field, suggests that an electron or any 
other elementary particle has a complex and subtle inner structure (e.g. 
perhaps even comparable to that of a radio) (Bohm & Hiley 1993, 37). 
A practical example of these concepts in effect is the already familiar double slit 
experiment. In the experiment electrons are fired through a diaphragm with two narrow 
slits for the electrons to pass through, and then captured on a photographic screen. The 
electrons are selected so that all are incident to one of the two slits. Here, Bohm and 
Hiley argue that the quantum field (𝜓) actually precedes the particles through the slits 
and provides to the pool of active information available to the particles. Now, the 
trajectories for all particles are pre-determined by the quantum potential and at no point 
is their location or momentum not well-defined. 
 
 
Figure 4: Proposed trajectories in a double-slit experiment (Bohm & Hiley, 1993, 33.) 
Respectively, the same mathematical treatment is given to many-body systems. For a 
system of two particles, writing the wave function in the polar form and solving the 
associated Schrödinger equation we get the Hamilton-Jacobi equation with the 
associated quantum potential: 
𝜕𝑆
𝜕𝑡
+
(𝛻1𝑆)
2
2𝑚
+
(𝛻2𝑆)
2
2𝑚
+ 𝑉 + 𝑄 = 0 
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𝑄 = −
ℏ
2𝑚
(𝛻1
2 + 𝛻2
2)𝑅
𝑅
 
with the continuum equation 
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑡
+ 𝛻1 ⋅ (
𝑃𝛻1𝑆
𝑚
) + 𝛻2 ⋅ (
𝑃𝛻2𝑆
𝑚
) = 0. 
 
The causal picture here is an extension of the one-body systems, but it also contains the 
particles’ mutual interaction. As discussed before, an important property of many-
particle quantum mechanics is entangled states. For Bohm and Hiley, this entails non-
local interaction.38 In line with the contemporary understanding of many-body quantum 
mechanics, they note that entangled states make the decomposition of the system (i.e. 
separable equations of it) impossible already at the level of a hydrogen atom: “it is 
impossible to find a single pre-assigned function of r, which would simultaneously 
represent the interaction of electron and proton in both s- and p-states” (Bohm & Hiley 
1993, 58). 
In this picture, the phase S and the quantum potential Q determine how the wave 
function affects particles in a given system. Particles then coordinate themselves 
according to a common pool of information, contained by the quantum field. If a system 
can be factorized to some number of subsystems (e.g. non-entangled states), these 
subsystems correspond to their independent pools of information. This pool is formally 
in configuration space (as is the case of formalisms of quantum mechanics in general), 
so it cannot be regarded as accessible in the three spatial dimensions – Bohm & Hiley 
(1993, 61) write:  
This is a further factor in addition to the form dependence of the activity 
of the field which leads us to consider the interpretation of this field as 
active information. The multidimensional nature of this field need not then 
be so mysterious, since information can be organized into as many sets of 
dimension as may be needed. 
As illustration, Bohm and Hiley sketch the formulas associated with the double slit 
experiment where the diaphragm (of mass M) is treated as a part in a bipartite system. It 
has a single, constant mass coordinate y, where the movement of the particle (of mass 
 
38 To note: entanglement and non-locality are not the same thing, for there exist entangled states which 
agree with the LHVM model. However, entanglement is a necessary condition for non-local interaction. 
(See e.g. Werner, 1989.) 
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m) is mapped to the x-coordinate. Approximating M>>m, we get the quantum potential 
for the electron: 
𝑄 = −
ℏ2𝛻𝑥
2𝑅(?⃗? − ?⃗?)
2𝑚𝑅(?⃗? − ?⃗?)
 
Because of the mass difference39, the quantum potential only acts on the electron, but 
the two systems are regardless participants to the same pool of information determining 
the movement of the electron. Thus, there is non-local interaction between the 
diaphragm and the particle. This relationship is functionally the same in the traditional 
examples of non-locality, such as the entanglement of the spin-states of two particles, 
insofar as they are affected by a common quantum field and thus participants to 
common information. (Bohm & Hiley 1993, 56—71.) 
 
III.II.I. RELATION TO THE BORN RULE 
 
The wave function is a state-representation of a quantum system. For any given state, 
the standard interpretation is that it gives a probability amplitude for a given state to be 
found with given parameters. Thus, taking the square modulus we get the probability 
density at this point for a particle to be found at a given point in space. This is the Born 
rule: 
|𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡)|2 = 𝜓∗𝜓 = 𝜌(𝑥, 𝑡). 
Because the net probability must amount to one, we get the normalization condition: 
∫ 𝜓∗𝜓 ⅆ𝑥
∞
−∞
= 1. 
So, the received view of the Born rule is that the wave function is a representation of 
epistemic probability. (Landsman 2009). By epistemic probability it is simply meant 
that the real observations made are congruent with the predictions entailed by the Born 
rule – but that nothing beyond that (frequentist) notion regarding the wave function can 
be stated. Bohm and Hiley disagree with this, stating that the relationship between |𝜓|2 
and 𝜌 is not necessary40, but that in usual conditions the probability density only 
 
39 The diaphragm system can be thought to be held externally fixed to eliminate complications regarding 
its movement. 
40 To clarify: if the square of the absolute value of the wave function and the probability density were 
demonstrably different notions, the Born rule would not hold. 
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approaches, or even equals an equilibrium distribution which is represented by |𝜓|2. In 
other words, in this theory, a system may initially be in a state disagreeing with standard 
quantum mechanics, but then evolve to a higher-entropy state which is always described 
by |𝜓|2. This is, of course, a necessary step to make, for Bohm and Hiley explicitly 
state that 𝜓 itself is a representation of a separate quantum field. Now, the term 𝜌 
determines the quantum potential in this respect. Bohm and Hiley write: 
This theory is formulated basically in terms of what Bell has called 
‘beables’ rather than of ‘observables’. These beables are assumed to have 
a reality that is independent of being observed or known in any other way. 
The observables therefore do not have a fundamental significance in our 
theory but rather are treated as statistical functions of the beables that are 
involved in what is currently called a measurement. (Bohm & Hiley 1993, 
40—41.) 
Empirically, no such cases are found where the relation 𝜌 ≠ |𝜓|2 arises (which could be 
the case at an early stage before entropic interactions). However, Bohm and Hiley 
briefly discuss the possibility of such an experiment.41 (Bohm & Hiley 1993, 181—
190.) 
 
III.II.II. SYSTEMS AS INDEPENDENT OF OBSERVATION 
 
To cash out the intended ontology, the description of these systems must be given in a 
way which does not rest on them being brought about by the observations alone. This 
means describing the process, including the instance of observation, as a total causal 
system. Bohm and Hiley give it their shot by giving an example of quantum tunnelling 
in one dimension. In quantum tunnelling, a wave packet is incident to a potential barrier 
of “height” V, at which point the wave packet is either reflected by the barrier, at some 
point of its lateral dimension, or transmitted through it. For singular wave packets, the 
process is seemingly undetermined (as is the case with e.g. where the electrons end up 
on the screen in the double-slit experiment) with some expectation values assigned for 
each possibility. The wave function is, then, different for wave packets in each of the 
three regions with separate complex coefficients for each of the functions: 
incident from the left + reflected from the right: 
𝜓1 = 𝐴ⅇ
ⅈ𝑘𝑥 + 𝐵ⅇ−ⅈ𝑘𝑥 
 
41 It is also suggested by Valentini (2008) that such cases might be found, by means of inflationary 
cosmology, in the vicinity of the Big Bang. 
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transmitted from the left + reflected from the right: 
𝜓2 =  𝐶ⅇ
𝑞𝑥 + 𝐷ⅇ−𝑞𝑥 
transmitted from the left: 
𝜓3 = 𝐸ⅇ
ⅈ𝑘𝑥 
In this case, as some of the particles are transmitted through the barrier, there is a small 
net velocity in the positive direction at the point where the incident and reflected wave 
packets overlap, with the standard form of an unbound wave packet in the region where 
only the transmitted wave packet is found: 
𝑣1 =
1
ⅈ2𝑚
(
𝜓∗𝛻𝜓−𝜓𝛻𝜓∗
𝜓∗𝜓
)  𝑣3 =
𝑘
𝑚
 
Bohm and Hiley argue that the transmission of a particle is causally determined by its 
initial position. Starting by modelling particles in the tunnelling case by mapping their 
trajectories from Gaussian42 functions (figure 5), Bohm and Hiley conclude that only 
the particles in front of a given wave packet have a possibility of transmitting. However, 
most of the particles that penetrate the potential barrier are eventually reflected. This is 
caused, essentially, by the wave packet dividing into two distinct channels: the channel 
of transmission and that of reflection. 
  
Figure 5: Proposed trajectories in quantum tunnelling (Bohm & Hiley 1993, 79.) 
 
42 The use of Gaussian functions in trajectory mapping is its own interesting subject with unfortunately 
little room in this thesis. The crux of the Bohmian approach is to calculate individual trajectories of 
particles in spreading of the Gaussian wave packet. In a simple free-particle case, combining the 
equations for the Gaussian wave function, the polar form of the wave function and expanding S we get 
𝑣(𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝑢 +
(𝑥 − 𝑢𝑡)𝑏𝑡
(1 + 𝑏𝑡2)
 
where u is the initial velocity of the ensemble and 𝑏 = ℏ2 ∕ 4𝑚2𝜎0
4. Integrating the equation of velocity 
one gets the trajectories for N number of particles. This methodology is used in figures 4 and 5. For a 
good summary, see Kumar Pan 2010. For more on the subject of trajectories in phase space, see e.g. 
Martens 2008. 
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In this case, instead of calculating the probability of transmission, the same equation 
refers to the probability of being in the “transmission-channel”. These channels do not 
overlap and remain distinct throughout the particle’s trajectory from its initial position 
to observation. They also contain their respective sets of active information and 
coordinate particle behaviour accordingly. Here Bohm and Hiley also introduce the 
distinction between active and inactive information. Because it is possible to alter the 
system mid-process so that the channels are forced to overlap, Bohm and Hiley 
conclude that a given particle is also associated with an empty channel containing 
inactive information, with the potentiality of the information becoming active later on.43 
(Bohm & Hiley 1993, 78—82.) 
This however raises a challenge: if these kinds of alterations make the channel-selection 
an open toss once again, it would seem that an observation is ultimately required to 
make it irreversible. Thus, this description seems to lie on the notion of observation 
after all. Bohm and Hiley argue that this is not the case, as this problem arises only in 
abstractions of a one-body model, whilst all the actual interactions involving multiple 
particles end up producing these irreversible effects.44 (Bohm & Hiley 1993, 78—82.) 
To avoid any notions of wave function collapse or corresponding ideas, also the 
instance of observation needs to be fleshed out in the ontological framework. Bohm and 
Hiley do this in a functionally similar way as they treated the diaphragm. That is, they 
treat the measuring instrument as a part of a many-body system. Defining the n-particle 
wave function as the standard series and introducing the measuring instrument as a 
wave packet of form 𝜙0(?⃗?), the combined wave function is given by: 
𝜓ⅈ(?⃗?, ?⃗? ) = 𝜙0(?⃗?) ∑ 𝐶𝑁𝜓𝑁(?⃗?)
𝑁
.   
When the particles interact with the measuring instrument, the wave function evolves 
into: 
 
43 The idea of inactive channels of information also entails that there are corresponding “empty wave 
packets” which do not act upon the particles in any way. Bohm’s and Hiley’s reasoning for this lies on the 
conception of the wave function as a description of a “field of information” instead of a physical wave. 
44 An example of particle scattering in a 3D tunnelling situation is given to illustrate this argument in 
Bohm and Hiley (1993, 79—82). The main point is that during the interaction of wave packets, non-
overlapping channels multiply and become distinct, which eliminates the possibility of future 
overlapping. While this seems to still beg the question of observation, it will not be specifically discussed 
here. 
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𝜓(?⃗?, ?⃗?, 𝑡) = ∑ 𝐶𝑁𝜓𝑁(?⃗?)𝜙0(?⃗? − 𝜆𝑂𝑁𝑡)
𝑁
, 
where 𝑂𝑁 are the eigenvalues of the operator O, with the respective eigenfunctions 
𝜓𝑁(?⃗?). In the duration of this interaction, Bohm and Hiley describe the same kind of 
overlapping of channels as was in the tunnelling case. After interaction, any overlap is 
eliminated, and the measuring instrument is forced to irreversibly “enter” a certain wave 
packet (i.e. enter a certain channel of information), in this case 𝜓𝑚(?⃗?)𝜙𝑚(?⃗?), with the 
corresponding probability for the instrument to be in that state corresponding to |𝐶𝑁|
2. 
The system will then be described by the wave function (Bohm & Hiley 1993, 98): 
𝜓𝑓 = ∑ 𝐶𝑁𝜓𝑁(?⃗?)𝜙0(?⃗? − 𝜆𝑂𝑁𝛥𝑡)
𝑁
. 
Bohm and Hiley write: 
We may […] indeed say that each of the possibilities 𝜓𝑚(?⃗?)𝜙𝑚(?⃗?) 
constitutes a kind of a channel. During the period of interaction with the 
quantum potential develops a structure of bifurcation points, such that 
apparatus particles initially on the trajectories leading to one side of these 
points enter, for example, the m:th channel, while the others do not. 
Eventually each particle enters one of the channels to the exclusion of all 
the others and thereafter stays in this channel. […] The fact that the 
apparatus particle must enter one of the possible channels and stay there is 
thus what is behind the possibility of a set of clearly distinct results of a 
quantum measurement. (Bohm & Hiley 1993, 99.) 
Thus, Bohm and Hiley argue that the notion of a “wave function collapse”, at least in a 
fundamental sense45, is averted. To clarify, what is argued for here is that causal 
determinism is preserved – what happens in the interaction between the measurement 
device and the measured system is a loss of potential in the unoccupied wave packets, 
or, the inactive channels. Thus, well-definedness is conserved regardless of overlapping 
or channel-selection mid-process. 
What does this mean in regard to the uncertainty principle? Bohm and Hiley naturally 
agree that the limitations imposed by the principle remain in place but refuse to accept 
that they entail that nothing under the effect of the uncertainty principle can be 
discussed (Bohm & Hiley 1993, 114). Instead, they liken such epistemological stances 
to “as if in the observation of the mature plant, we were said to be ‘measuring’ the 
 
45 Bohm and Hiley also write: “[W]e can say that everything has happened as if the overall wave function 
had ‘collapsed’ to one corresponding to the actual result obtained in the measurement. We emphasise, 
however, that in our treatment there is no actual collapse[.]” 
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properties of the seed” (ibid). As did Bohr, Bohm and Hiley recognize that the 
participatory nature of the observation event cannot be experimentally isolated from the 
observed system. However, they maintain, as their main contrast with Bohr, that the 
independent system should be discussed as well. 
 
III.III. METHODOLOGICAL DISCUSSION AND CRITICISM 
 
The de Broglie-Bohm interpretation is usually categorized as a hidden variable 
interpretation, although it bears little to no resemblance to the LHVM introduced in the 
EPR paper46. The reasoning for this is that the description of the particle’s position 
along with non-local interaction with the quantum potential can be thought of as some 
sort of a “non-local hidden variable theory”. Indeed, much of the discussion pertaining 
to the possibility of hidden variables in quantum mechanics have involved the de 
Broglie-Bohm interpretation in some way or another. Of note here is that to correctly 
recount the discussion, the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation is referred to as a hidden 
value interpretation, but the term is arguably ill-defined and loose (referring, with some 
caveats, to anything that makes a theory deterministic).47  
All hidden variables in quantum mechanics were supposed to be proven impossible by 
John von Neumann in his 1932 book “Mathematische Grundlagen der 
Quantenmechanik”. In short, the proof goes as follows: take whichever two quantities, 
say, ?⃗? and 𝑆. In a statistical ensemble, a measurement can be made for both ?⃗? and 𝑆 in 
separate subsystems. Thus we get the definition of their combined expectation value: 
⟨?⃗? + 𝑆⟩ = ⟨?⃗?⟩ + ⟨𝑆⟩ 
If the two quantities cannot be jointly measured (as is the case, of course, with position 
and momentum), the definition is implicit in the sense that it does not correspond to any 
measuring arrangement. Now, two assumptions must hold at all times when dealing 
with quantum theory. Firstly, for every physical quantity ?⃗? there must be a 
corresponding Hermitian operator R in Hilbert space. Secondly, this correspondence 
must include addition relations. From this it can be deduced48 that for any arbitrary 
 
46 It is important to separate the LHVM, which is conclusively proven to be false, from the wider usage of 
the term “hidden variables”. It has been shown that locality cannot be preserved, but if hidden variables 
are taken to include causal theories of non-local interaction as well, no such demonstration exists. 
47 The notion was also rejected by Bohm & Hiley (1993, 2). 
48 It’s impossible to go through the whole proof in full detail here. 
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physical quantity in any arbitrary ensemble of systems, say ?⃗?, its expectation value can 
be written as 
⟨𝑅⟩ = Tr(𝑈𝑅), 
where U is a Hermitian density operator characterizing the ensemble. From this it 
follows that whatever the choice of U and R, the statistical spread of R in the trace does 
not vanish. Because the whole point of hidden variables is to eliminate all statistical 
spread, it is concluded that they cannot be introduced into the formalism of quantum 
mechanics without breaking it apart. 
The proof was widely accepted as the final word on hidden variables until Bell in his 
1966 paper “On the Problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics”. Shortly put, 
Bell’s criticism was that von Neumann’s proof lied on a false assumption regarding 
linear combinations of operators. For non-commuting operators, the combined 
eigenvalue r+s of the operator combination R+S is not a linear combination of R and S 
separately, and because of this, the proof does not exclude all hidden variables. More 
generally, it does not exclude any theory reproducing the empirical content of quantum 
mechanics in a different framework. However, the proof still successfully demonstrates 
that hidden variables cannot be included in a formalism which assigns all measurable 
physical quantities bijective operators in Hilbert space. In other words, the operator 
formalism would not work without statistical dispersion. This implies a limitation on 
possible quantum-physical theories: as long as an essential characteristic of the theory is 
the operator bijection as presented above, the spread cannot be eliminated.49  
In any case, as far as interpretations go, hidden variables do not exclude correct 
empirical predictions in quantum mechanics, which is why it is possible for the de 
Broglie-Bohm interpretation to be non-contradictory. The interpretation of 𝜓 as a 
“quantum field” in the context of the solution to the Schrödinger equation, in the words 
of Bernstein (2011), has nothing to do with the von Neumann proof.  
A second challenge to any hidden variable interpretation of quantum theory is the 
Kochen-Specker theorem, which is a further development of the kinds of no-go-
theorems that started with von Neumann’s proof, with narrower focus on properties of 
 
49 It is argued that this was von Neumann’s intention anyway, as opposed to giving some sort of 
conclusive proof of the impossibility of hidden variables in nature - while other views on the subject have 
simply been misunderstandings on behalf of both opponents and proponents of hidden variable theories. 
See Bub 2010. 
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quantum theory itself. Whereas the caveat in the von Neumann proof was that non-
commutative operators were able to violate the theorem, the Kochen-Specker theorem 
derives the full results by the means of commutative operators alone without exceptions 
when considering non-commutative operators. (Kochen & Specker 1967). The final 
statement of the Kochen-Specker theorem, then, is as follows: any hidden-variable 
interpretation, in order to be non-contradictory, must abandon one or more of these 
three principles (Held 2018): 
Value-definiteness: all observables in a given system have definite values 
at all times. 
Non-contextuality: all properties in a quantum system are possessed by 
the system independently of a measuring event. 
Operator projection: all physical quantities of a quantum mechanical 
system have a bijective relationship to their respective operators in Hilbert 
space. 
The theorem, although notoriously complicated in its proof, holds true, and thus it is 
indeed required that any interpretation accommodates it by abandoning one or more of 
the aforementioned principles. The path taken by the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation 
can already be seen: it abandons non-contextuality. This is a quite straight-forward 
consequence from the fact that the theory is able to reproduce the empirical content of 
quantum mechanics whilst preserving value-definiteness in its ontology. It can then be 
seen that the measurement instance must necessarily be a part of the total system, and 
that it causes the unavoidable statistical dispersion. Recall from III.II.II. the 
formalization of measurement as a part of the total wave function of the system. Due to 
non-local interference, the measuring apparatus affects the channels that are eventually 
selected, thus, causally, participating in the realization of the observed results. However, 
the epistemic uncertainty involved in this process cannot be eliminated, as that would 
require a functional empirical theory that included non-contextuality as well – which is 
exactly what is being ruled out by the Kochen-Specker theorem. 
An interesting parallel to the contextuality of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation are the 
views presented by Bohr. Both seem to be in a certain agreement regarding the holistic 
nature of the combined system of the measurement apparatus and the measured 
quantities when considering actual observations. Recall from II.II.III.III. Bohr’s 
statement: “…I advocated the application of the word “phenomenon” exclusively to 
refer to the observations obtained under specified circumstances, including an account 
of the whole experimental arrangement.” (Bohr 1949, 24.) For Bohr, there is no way of 
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speaking about the independent system without instruments being used in conjunction. 
Thus, one must restrict their whole class of statements regarding quantum mechanics to 
specific phenomena in specific circumstances. Bohr states elsewhere: 
[I]t is equally important to understand that just this circumstance implies 
that no result of an experiment concerning a phenomenon which, in 
principle, lies outside the range of classical physics can be interpreted as 
giving information about independent properties of the objects, but is 
inherently connected with a definite situation in the description of which 
measuring instruments interacting with the objects also enter essentially. 
(Bohr 1958, 26.) 
It is again needed to stress that by indistinguishability, Bohr does not mean a weaker 
statement regarding the empirical measurement with some leeway on the possibility of 
separation between the system and the apparatus on some other ontological level. 
Rather he means a total ban on statements that aim to bring forth a picture of how 
different components interact with each other to make the said measurement come about 
– this is Bohr’s “contextuality”. To give this attitude more structure, I’ll sketch two 
contextual statements: 
(C1) All observations of quantum mechanics refer to the total system 
involving the system being measured and the measuring apparatus as well 
as their surroundings. 
(C2) All statements concerning how separate components of the total 
system interact causally to bring the observation about, violating the 
epistemic limit of the uncertainty principle, are prohibited. 
While Bohr makes both statements (Bohr e.g. 1949, 46), the proponents of the de 
Broglie-Bohm interpretation accept (C1) but reject (C2). The grounds for this is that, 
although unable to circumvent the uncertainty principle, the interpretation is non-
contradictory while preserving value definiteness.50 Bohm and Hiley formulate their 
contextuality on the participatory nature of the event of observation, and only aim to 
fade out the notion of wave function collapse in their framework of channels of active 
 
50 It is worthwhile to clarify that the value-definiteness of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation, or 
Bohmian mechanics, concerns particle positions, but not other operators such as momentum or energy. 
This is a consequence of the dynamics in the interpretation: positions are defined in real space ℝ3 where 
other quantities operate in configuration space of dimensions ℝ3𝑁. The positions are not, in this ontology, 
a part of the wave function (as a separate field) but other quantities, such as the velocity field, are. 
Reasoning for this is the way of formalizing the action of the quantum potential, as stated by Bohm & 
Hiley (1993, 61): 
The fact that the wave function is in configuration space clearly prevents us from 
regarding the quantum field as one that carries energy and momentum […] which leads 
us to consider the interpretation of this field as active information. The multidimensional 
nature of this field need not then be so mysterious, since information can be organised 
into as many sets of dimension as may be needed. 
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information. In describing the quantum processes independently of observations, they 
do not object to the fact that all observations require the system-modifying interaction 
of the measuring apparatus – they only argue that there exists an independent 
description of the kind they are presenting. They write: 
It is clear then that we are not ‘measuring’ a state that has already been in 
existence. Rather the apparatus and the observed system have participated 
in each other, and in this process they have deeply affected each other. 
After the interaction is over we are left, as already pointed out in the 
previous section, with a situation in which the states of the two are 
correlated, in accordance with the channel that the particles have actually 
entered. (Bohm & Hiley 1993, 107.) 
However, other kinds of criticisms have been directed towards the de Broglie-Bohm 
interpretation. Of these, the most important is the suspicion that it does not actually say 
anything novel about quantum mechanics. Heisenberg, one of the most prominent 
contemporary critics of the interpretation, writes: 
This objective “description”, however, reveals itself as a kind of 
“ideological superstructure”, which has little to do with immediate 
physical reality; for the “hidden parameters” of Bohm’s interpretation are 
of such a kind that they can never occur in the description of real 
processes, if the quantum theory remains unchanged. - - The first 
consequence of this is that Bohm’s interpretation cannot be refuted by 
experiment, and this is true of all the counter-proposals in the first group 
[Heisenberg’s category of purely philosophical interpretations]. From the 
fundamentally “positivistic” (it would perhaps be better to say “purely 
physical”) standpoint, we are thus concerned not with counter-proposals to 
the Copenhagen interpretation, but with its exact repetition in a different 
language. (Heisenberg 1955, 18.) 
On the same track was Wolfgang Pauli. In correspondence with Bohm, he stated: 
I do not see any longer the possibility of any logical contradiction as long 
as your results agree completely with those of the usual wave mechanics 
and as long as no means is given to measure the values of your hidden 
parameters both in the measuring apparatus and in the observed system. 
As far as the whole matter stands now, your “extra wave-mechanical 
predictions” are still a check, which cannot be cashed. (Pauli 1951, ref. 
Meyenn 1996, 436.) 
These criticism are instrumental in giving light to the motivation of any realistic 
interpretation. The overall argument in these objections does not concern any properties 
of a first-order physical theory, and it is, in fact, perfectly summarized by Bohm in his 
reply to Pauli’s letter:  
Since you admit the logical consistency of my point of view, and since 
you cannot give any arguments showing that it is wrong, it seems to me 
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that your desire to hold on to the usual interpretation can have only one 
justification; namely, the positivist principle of not postulating constructs 
that do not correspond to things that can not be observed. (Bohm 1951, 
ref. Meyenn 1996, 442.) 
This discussion ties back into the Bohr-Einstein discussions of 20’s and 30’s. As told in 
II.II.III.III, Einstein was dissatisfied with the lack of ontology in the received view of 
quantum theory, calling it a “bloodless ghost” (Einstein 1949, 3). This dissatisfaction 
motivated Einstein, but his methods for seeking reconciliation were purely epistemic. 
However, as was already discussed, Einstein’s methods did not work, and the no-go 
theorems give strong reason to assume that any such means are contradictory with 
quantum theory altogether.  
An important methodological clarification is in order before proceeding forward. I have 
made several choices made up to this point which greatly impact the scope of what is 
being discussed in the latter part of the thesis. The choices are as follows: 
• It is recognized that there is only one theory of quantum phenomena, 
namely the quantum theory. This is because every other formulation of 
quantum mechanics (i.e. other than those based on standard wave or 
matrix mechanics) produce exactly the same empirical predictions. 
• Interpretations of quantum theory, as discussed in this thesis, are 
subsidiary to the theoretical structure of quantum theory. If there were 
a contradictory experiment to quantum theory, as would be the case if, 
for example, uncertainty relations were circumvented in order to gain 
information about an electron’s history, then the theory that predicted 
the experiment would be contradictory with quantum theory. This 
theory, then, would not be an interpretation of quantum theory. 
• While the possibility of an experiment that refuted quantum theory is 
not overruled, this thesis only discusses the situation where quantum 
theory is not refuted. 
These choices are arguably uncontroversial. The tension between the quantum theory 
and novel experiments bringing about new information was recognized already in the 
EPR paper by remarks such as:  
While we have thus shown that the wave function does not provide a 
complete description of the physical reality, we left open the question of 
whether or not such a description exists. (Einstein, Podolsky & Rosen 
1935, 780.) 
It was also explicitly stated by Bohm in 1957 that the possibility of sub-atomic 
experiments would also bring about, possibly, a whole range of theories distinct from 
the quantum theory: 
More important, however, is the fact that in terms of the notion of a 
subquantum mechanical level, we are enabled to consider a whole range of 
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qualitatively new kinds of theories, approaching the usual form of the 
quantum theory only as approximations that hold in limiting cases. (Bohm 
1957, 85.) 
Moving forward, the constraints of quantum theory lead into the discussion of the 
nature of physics in general, or, what that nature should be. The question is: is physics a 
purely positivist enterprise or something more in terms of describing nature? For the 
proponents of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation, physical theories should without a 
doubt strive towards a description of real physical processes. Now, to properly honour 
the approach of many of the proponents of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation 
(including Bohm51), this means maintaining research and hypotheses beyond quantum 
theory in order to sustain the possibility for progress. However, the interpretative 
content pertaining to quantum theory, in connection to physical realism, is also argued 
for. Bohm and Hiley write: 
It follows from [Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s stances] that quantum 
mechanics can say little or nothing about reality itself. In philosophical 
terminology, it does not give what can be called an ontology for a quantum 
system. (Bohm & Hiley 1993, 2—4.) 
This statement is echoed by Bricmont (2016, 179): 
[I]f ordinary quantum mechanics is a theory, what is it a theory of? If it is 
a theory about results of measurements, then it is not a physical theory, 
which is supposed to deal with the world outside of our laboratories and to 
be checked by experiments, but not be limited to them. If it is a theory 
about the world outside of our laboratories, then what does it say? […] 
[T]he answer to that crucial question is often ambiguous or even, when 
made precise, false (because no quantum state ever collapses under the 
ordinary quantum evolution, or because of the no hidden variables 
theorems). So the point of the de Broglie–Bohm theory is simply to be the 
missing theory behind the quantum algorithm. 
The proponents of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation also argue that the reason for the 
wide acceptance of standard quantum mechanics lies simply on historical order – the 
Copenhagen interpretation came first. On this, Goldstein (2017, 15) writes: 
[I]t is only with a purely instrumental attitude towards scientific theories 
that Bohmian mechanics and standard quantum mechanics can possibly be 
regarded as different formulations of exactly the same theory. … Those 
impressed by the “not-a-distinct-theory” objection presumably give 
considerable weight to the fact that standard quantum mechanics came 
first. Supporters of Bohmian mechanics give more weight to its greater 
simplicity and clarity. 
 
51 The present hypothetical status of the proposed physical processes was also at no point contested by 
Bohm. 
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Of note is that Goldstein refers here to Bohmian mechanics which is often used 
interchangeably with the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation. However, it more properly 
refers to the mechanical formalisms in the interpretation (as opposed to those of 
standard quantum mechanics). Goldstein also mentions simplicity and clarity as 
strengths of Bohmian mechanics. Similar statements are made, for example, by Bohm 
and Hiley (1993, 58—60). Such arguments, for one side or the other, are not considered 
here. This is because they are not of interest in the attempt of finding non-subjective 
standards for interpretations. However, there are reasons to find these sorts of 
statements dubious.52 In any case, Bohm and Hiley double down on the argument from 
historical order (1993, 4): 
Let us suppose however that the Solvay Congress [of 1927, where de 
Broglie first presented the concept of the pilot wave] had gone the other 
way and that de Broglie’s ideas had eventually been adopted and 
developed. What then would have happened, if 25 years later some 
physicists had come along and had proposed the current interpretation 
(which is at present the conventional one)? Clearly by then there would be 
a large number of physicists trained in the de Broglie interpretation and 
these would have found it difficult to change. They would naturally have 
asked: “What do we concretely gain if we do change, if after all the results 
are all the same?” 
This discussion can be now be summarized. First and foremost, we have the objection 
from empirical equivalence: 
(OEE) The de Broglie-Bohm interpretation has exactly the same empirical 
content with standard quantum mechanics, and no other property in it can 
be justified on the basis of observations. It is thus exactly the same theory 
with a surplus of speculation that cannot be vindicated. 
To this, we have the counter-statements from ontology and history: 
(CO) Although the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation has the same empirical 
content as the standard interpretation, it is nevertheless to be preferred 
because it provides an account of real physical processes which the 
standard interpretation fails to do. 
(CH) The reason the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation is not preferred is 
historical: the standard interpretation simply came first. In an alternative 
world, where the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation came first, the scientific 
 
52 From a purely instrumental point of view, it is of course perfectly reasonable to prefer formulations of 
greater simplicity and/or elegance, if they function as more efficient tools for attaining the desired results. 
Examples for the application of different techniques are countless for anyone familiar with physics. 
However, this is obviously far from making an argument for the ontological priority of the objects posited 
in a given framework. It is to be noted that these kinds of arguments have, however, been made in other 
contexts than the de Broglie-Bohm interpretations as well, such as in string theory. For further discussion, 
see Dardashti, Dawid & Thébault (2019, e.g. 109). 
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community would object to the Copenhagen interpretation in a similar 
way than they do now to the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation. 
A certain tension can be seen to appear between the two counter-statements. For if one 
accepts (CH), this is to say that, in a remotely Kuhnian fashion, the grounds for 
accepting a theory in a scientific community is due to the associated historical and 
sociological context. However, (CO) states that there are reasons related to the 
interpretations themselves for why one should be preferred over the other. The supposed 
tension is easily enough dissolved by stating the counter-statement from ontology and 
history: 
(CO&H) The de Broglie-Bohm interpretation should be preferred because 
it describes real physical processes. It would in fact be preferred, if not for 
the unfortunate historical timing of it. The scientific community is led 
astray by their insistence on the received view, and thus fail to recognize a 
viable alternative. 
This is most certainly a statement a proponent of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation 
agrees with. What is now pressing is whether there exists any argumentative way to find 
a philosophical resolution to the dispute between (OEE) and (CO&H) – which is to say, 
whether there is something to say about this that is not a matter of taste. Historically, the 
discussion on this matter has been mostly restricted to passages of a few sentences of 
the kind presented above. This subject, however, touches the topic of non-empirical 
confirmation in physics, which has been recently discussed by Dawid (2019, 99—119) 
and Rovelli (2019, 120—124). In his response to Dawid’s article leaning on 
Bayesianism in theory-confirmation, Rovelli writes: 
Theorists do not develop theories at random. They use powerful 
theoretical, non-empirical, motivations for creating, choosing, and 
developing theories. If these did not exist, the formidable historical 
success of theoretical physics would be incomprehensible. To evaluate 
theories, they routinely employ a vaste [sic] array of non-empirical 
arguments, increasing or decreasing their confidence in this or that 
theoretical idea, before the hard test of empirical confirmation[.] (Rovelli 
2019, 122.) 
Later, he writes on the difference between established and tentative theories: 
In their domains of validity, classical electrodynamics and Newtonian 
mechanics are considered even more reliable: We routinely entrust our 
lives to them. No sensible person would entrust her life to a prediction of 
string theory. 
The distinction is there and is clear. A philosophy of science blind to this 
distinction is a bad philosophy of science. It is so important that phrasing 
it in terms of a higher or lower Bayesian degree of belief obfuscates the 
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point: In science we do have theories that are “confirmed” or 
“established,” which means that they are extremely reliable in their 
domain. Then we have other theories that perhaps enjoy the confidence of 
some scientists but are considered tentative: We wouldn’t entrust to them 
even our life savings. (Rovelli 2019, 122.) 
What Rovelli stresses here is the distinction between scientific discovery and 
justification, of which the latter is routinely understood as confirmatory observations. In 
this framework, a theory is tentative if there does not yet exist a (set of) observation(s) 
to confirm it. Naturally, a tentative theory is not invalid, but there must be a (set of) 
prediction(s) it makes in order for it to be a viable contender. Now, the discussion of 
(OEE) vs. (CO&H) touches on this topic, but does not fall under it, for the predictions 
of the Copenhagen and the de Broglie-Bohm interpretations are equivalent. Moreover 
and at the risk of repetition, from the Kochen-Specker theorem we know that there is no 
possibility for the predictions to differ. What this means is that they are indeed stances 
on the same theory (which means talk of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation as a theory 
is misguided).53 This component of (OEE) is thus granted.54 However, this does not 
solve the dispute, for even as we accept that the theory is the same, it says nothing on 
the matter of preference of interpretation. The question that remains from (OEE) is: can 
the non-observational relations and entities in the de Broglie-Bohm be vindicated?  
Moving forward, any historical or sociological arguments regarding the acceptance of 
any interpretation will not be discussed in any other capacity than as a challenge for this 
philosophical project: if any robust philosophical reasoning for the priority of one 
interpretation over the other cannot be found, then I concede that a sociological reason 
is as good as any other. In order to avoid this rather uncomfortable situation and gain 
fruitful ground in this discussion, what is proposed in this thesis is a disassembly of the 
notion of interpretation.  
In the following chapter, the use of this notion in the context of logic and scientific 
models is scrutinized in order to find some, if any, agreement on what the reference of 
the term is or should be. This is not done in order to fix a conclusive definition of the 
 
53 This idea has already been presented by Quine in his “Pursuit of Truth” (1992, §41). 
54 In order to alleviate concern that logical positivism is slipped in through the back door here, it can be 
said that it is rather brought in from the front. Strictly, in the domain of physics, the only way to justify 
and sustainably establish empirical theories is observation. This says nothing of the process of discovery. 
More importantly, nothing is said here about the preference of interpretation – only the boundary 
conditions for established theories are outlined. I also want to stress that this statement is made only in 
reference to the field of physics; nothing is said of any other discipline. This also to say that the difficult 
and non-uniform relationship between discovery and justification across the sciences is duly noted – but 
here we are only concerned with theoretical physics. 
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notion, but to find some clarification to the discussion presented above. 
 
IV. INTERPRETATION AND QUANTUM MECHANICS 
IV.I. MODELS IN PHYSICS 
 
To begin the theoretical treatment of the notion of ‘interpretation’ in quantum 
mechanics, it is natural to acknowledge an important discussion related to the notion. 
The field of model research in philosophy of science is vast, and contributions 
overlapping physics have been recently made for example by Suárez and Pero (2018), 
Suárez and Cartwright (2008), Contessa (2007, 2010), van Fraassen (2012), da Costa 
and French (2000, 2003), French (2010), and Mäki (2006, 2009). However, for the 
purposes of constructing a definition of interpretation in the relevant context, we will 
incidentally find the relevant pointers from the four articles discussed next.55 
Frigg (2012) states that the most common use for the notion of model is a simplified 
and stylized version of the target system it represents.56 The relationship between theory 
and models, in its simplest form, can be thought to be a transition from the general to 
the particular. By this train of thought, theories are sort of ‘families’ of models, while 
models themselves are applications of the theory in certain situations.57 Fürth (1968) 
divides models in theoretical physics to into four categories: 
F1 Functional models 
F2 Structural models 
F3 Scale models 
F4 Analogue models 
This categorization is useful for the purpose of this thesis, for it allows identifying and 
demarcating the kinds of models that are relevant in the context of quantum 
mechanics.58 By (F1), functional models, Fürth means mathematical formulae meant to 
describe and predict the behavior of the target system. Naturally, the equations need to 
 
55 The papers discussed here are fairly old – from 1953, 1968 and 1980. However, no discussions of 
models relevant to this topic and constrained to the domain of physics have been published recently. The 
content of these papers, in any case, is what matters – and as such, the relevant points for the purposes of 
this thesis are already made during the 20th century. 
56 No discussion regarding models as set-theoretical structures with isomorphic relations to their target 
systems will be entertained here. However, they will be touched in the following chapter in the context of 
model theory. 
57 However, the distinction between theories and models is not and need not be so straightforward, as 
theories range from more general to less, and they also always require interpretation upon application. 
58 This is not to say that the categorization is conclusive or even the most descriptive one made: just that 
for isolating the notion of “interpretation” in the context of QM, we have a good freeway here, as we shall 
shortly see. 
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be simplified in order to be generalizable – it is impossible for a model to share a 1:1 
correspondence with the target system. Thus, these models can be thought as ‘idealized’ 
– but that does not mean they are ‘false’ in the sense that they could not provide reliable 
knowledge of nature. As a contrast, (F2) structural models are (a set of) assumptions 
regarding the aggregate behavior of an ensemble of systems. Examples would be a 
picturization of an object’s surface composed of atoms in a neat homogenous order, or 
the ‘electron cloud’ in the Rutherford model of the atom. Obviously, no neat order of 
atoms can be observed nor strictly inferred, but such a picture can be idealized from 
various scattering experiments. Similarly, the position of the electron in the nucleus’ 
‘orbit’ can only be understood in statistical terms (in the context of the standard 
interpretation of quantum theory, at the very least), but it can also be visualized as a 
‘cloud’. 
As the (F3), we have scale models, which refers to usually macroscopic structures 
constructed in order to help understand some mechanisms behind mathematical 
formalisms. An example of this is a set of colored balls held together by pins as means 
of demonstrating atom bonding. Although these kinds of models usually share no strict 
consistency with the target system (in the atom bonding example, macroscopic objects 
are used to demonstrate microscopic mechanisms which obviously disobey macroscopic 
laws), they can still be useful in aiding understanding of the systems being studied, as 
long as the limits of their reference are understood. Finally, models can be analogies 
(F4), which Fürth takes roughly to mean that a mathematical description of some 
system can be usefully applied to some other system as well. A very common example 
of this is the use of harmonic oscillators to describe all kinds of systems exhibiting 
sinusoidal behavior, from springs and pendulums to the microscopic description of 
temperature. 
Other takes on the kinds of models present in physics have been, of course, presented. 
The subject of models as analogues has been studied in greater detail by Mary Hesse. In 
her 1953 paper “Models in Physics”, Hesse differentiates between two uses of the 
notion: 
a) An analogy between two branches of physics – this is the sense in which Fürth 
understands analogies. As a further example, Hesse provides the similarities 
between the theories of heat and electrostatics. 
b) A general relation between a model and the target system – for example, the billiard 
ball model of gas molecules. Of this, Hesse writes:  
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“When we say in this way that here is an analogy between a model and certain 
phenomena of nature, we are in some sense asserting an identity of mathematical 
structure between the model and nature, as in sense (a) we are asserting such an 
identity between two theories.” (Hesse 1953, 201.) 
To cut to the chase, in Hesse’s framework, the sense (b) more or less encompasses 
Fürth’s senses (F1) – (F3). A further take is provided by Redhead (1980), who 
identifies, at the very least, three use cases for models. Recognizing Hesse, Redhead 
admits that treating models as analogies “[…] hence may justify the physicist in 
pursuing the possibility that the model behavior is also exhibited by the full theory”, but 
adds: “physicists should always be aware of the potential fallibility in this mode of 
reasoning” (Redhead 1980, 161). Redhead’s warning stems from how he understands 
the notion of analogy: 
A mathematical model arises when we establish a formal analogy between 
a physical theory and some mathematical structure. This latter may often 
be embedded in some wider structure leading to the notion of ‘surplus’ 
structure in the mathematical formulation of a physical theory. The 
calculus associated with this wider structure is partially interpreted by 
means of the original theory T. This is typically how partially interpreted 
theories actually arise in physics. (Redhead 1980, 149.) 
Redhead also identifies something he calls “floating models” – models that are neither 
inferred from underlying theory nor constructed from direct novel observations. This 
has to do with a so-called computation gap: if the target system becomes too complex to 
model directly by inferring from theory, and a model accounting for the empirical 
results is nonexistent, some approximation for a defined singular case can be used in 
order to aid further enquiry. This, of course, has a lot to do with heuristics. Redhead 
stresses that heuristic properties of models fall into the category of scientific discovery 
and, as such, are difficult if not impossible to systematize. This is echoed by Hesse, who 
writes: “The main point … is that there can be no set of rules given for the procedure of 
scientific discovery[.]” (Hesse 1953, 198.) 
Here, we have a natural connection, again, to Fürth’s senses (F2) and (F3). Both 
structural and scale models obviously have a strong heuristic function. Furthermore, in 
these sorts of cases, the simplest form of the relation between theory and models is 
inapplicable. And at the risk of stating the obvious, when dealing with models of 
heuristic priority, the scientist must take care to properly attend to the epistemic 
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limitations of the given model.59 In any case, a common thread of this discussion in 
theoretical physics is the admittance that, in some cases, no other model than a 
mathematical formulation can be found – and in these sorts of cases, the mathematical 
formalism itself has to be accepted as the model of the given phenomena.60 Redhead’s 
view on the matter is reflected in the quote above. Further, Hesse writes: 
Mathematical formalisms, when used as hypotheses in the description of 
physical phenomena, may function like the mechanical models of an 
earlier stage in physics, without having in themselves any mechanical or 
other physical interpretation. (Hesse 1953, 189—199.) 
In many cases the real progress was made in terms of a mathematical 
model: the mechanical model was then added only as an afterthought in 
the mistaken belief that it endowed the mathematics with a respectability it 
would not otherwise possess. (Hesse 1953, 212.) 
Thea above is also a premise of Fürth’s functional models: 
It is the generally accepted view that the laws of physics are expressed in 
the form of mathematical equations between certain variable quantities or 
‘parameters’ which may either be capable of assuming any values within a 
certain range (continuous parameters) or are restricted to a finite or 
infinite, but enumerable set of discrete values (discontinuous parameters). 
(Fürth 1968, 327). 
What we are of course interested in here, for the time being at least, are the formalisms 
of quantum mechanics and their relation to the discussion of models. It is the view 
adopted in this thesis that Fürth’s category of functional models in fact describes the 
relation between the mathematics of quantum mechanics and the observations they refer 
to adequately. The reason for this selection will become more apparent later in this 
section. However, it is already apparent that any possible mathematical application of 
quantum theory is an as-accurate-as-can-be description of the system producing the 
observed phenomena. They serve no specific heuristic role outside of describing the 
system, nor are they structural or scale models. Shortly put, what one is dealing with 
when considering the formulae of quantum theory is the description of as small physical 
processes as can be described. Of functional models, Fürth writes further: 
In many cases the parameters referring to a functional model can directly 
be identified with the parameters of a real system. For example the 
quantities 'current intensity' and 'potential' appearing in Ohm's law, which 
 
59 The statement would be: heuristic models do not have any necessary connection to the actual 
phenomenon outside of helping to understand some features of it. Thus, overextending the reference of 
the model can and will lead to false conclusions about the object of the model. 
60 Another way of saying this is: in physics there are situations where no other kinds of models (as in, for 
example, actual pictures) of a system can be assigned than the mathematical description without losing 
accuracy. 
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applies to a fictitious 'linear circuit' model, can be identified with the 
quantities measured by means of galvanometers and electrometers on real, 
three-dimensional electric systems. On the other hand, especially in the 
case of 'quantum' models, some of the quantities appearing in the 
mathematical relationships meant to represent the behavior of the model, 
like 'wave functions' and 'matrices', are only indirectly connected with 
'observable' parameters. For instance the wave function representing a 
beam of electrons is only related to the relative frequencies with which the 
electrons within the beam proceed in various directions and which can be 
observed by suitable measuring devices, but not to the movement of the 
individual electrons. (Fürth 1968, 328.) 
In quantum mechanics, it is in this discussion natural to think of the equations 
predicting the behavior of physical systems themselves composing the most accurate 
models; although there are many visualizations constructed in service of especially 
heuristics, they have inevitable limits in terms of description.61 In a purely empirical 
science, the model that predicts the observations is the model to use. Along the same 
lines is Hesse, who writes: 
All that the physicist can certainly determine about the nature are 
experimental results, usually expressed by measurements, and therefore 
the assertion of an analogy must mean at least that there are resemblances 
between these results and the model. The resemblances are in fact 
correspondences between the observed measurements and certain numbers 
deduced from the model; for example, if the appropriate calculations on 
the theory of mechanics are made about the energy of colliding billiard 
balls, we can obtain a numerical value which is the same as that shown on 
the scale of a thermometer placed in a vessel containing a gas. (Hesse 
1953, 201.) 
To understand the nature of possible quantum-mechanical models one can think of, for 
example, the already familiar quantum tunneling case. For the Schrödinger equation in a 
one-dimensional space, we write: 
−
ℏ2
2𝑚
ⅆ2
ⅆ𝑥2
𝛹(𝑥) + 𝑉(𝑥)𝛹(𝑥) = 𝐸𝛹(𝑥). 
When 𝑉 − 𝐸 ≠ 0 and constant, we get: 
𝑉 − 𝐸 < 0 ⇒ 𝑘2 = −
2𝑚
ℏ2
(𝑉 − 𝐸)     𝑎𝑛ⅆ     𝑉 − 𝐸 > 0 ⇒ 𝑞2 =
2𝑚
ℏ2
(𝑉 − 𝐸) 
 
61 However, properly interpreted they do have a lot of value in very specific circumstances – such as the 
graphical tools used by engineers in the study of quantum-mechanical systems. But as a general 
description of quantum physics there is reason to take their limit of adequacy into account. (As a natural 
example, a visual representation of a wave packet does not justify the scientist to think of the system of 
actually consisting of such wave packets.) 
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where the terms k and q are of course derived from the wave function. For this case, 
what we see above is the (general and idealized) model of the probability amplitudes in 
quantum tunneling, from which the respective probabilities are derived. Some 
understandable questions might arise: the model makes use of entities, such as the wave 
function in superposition of a range of states, which do not map directly to any 
observables62 – how can they be part of any model? A straightforward answer would be 
to appeal to the purely instrumental nature of the functional model – it exists to 
formalize the observations made in a unified framework. The wave function is a root 
object in the model from which the observations, by appropriate operations, can be 
predicted (up to the ultimate limit of accuracy). To make this clearer, there is an 
epistemic reference for the wave function: it represents the probability amplitude from 
which expectation values etc. are derived in correspondence to measurements. A 
functional model does not need to ontologically correspond to the observations made, in 
the direct sense, as long as, again, the epistemic limits of the model are acknowledged. 
Fürth seems to agree with this:  
On the other hand most scientists are convinced that the fundamental laws 
of nature are essentially simple, and the search for these laws is 
characterised by the attempts to generalise, to simplify, and to unify 
established relationships. The question arises how these apparent 
contradictions can be resolved. The answer is, I believe, that in actual fact 
the parameters, appearing in the equations meant to express the laws of 
physics, do not refer to actual physical systems but to fictitious systems 
which are constructions of the theoretical physicist and only bear a certain 
resemblance in their behaviour to real physical systems. (Fürth 1968, 328.) 
In this case, this certain resemblance is simply that the observations made in quantum 
physics correspond to the predictions from the equations of quantum mechanics. Here, 
the relationship between model and theory is also straightforward: quantum mechanics 
encompasses the equations of subatomic systems and the understanding of their 
reference to observations, and these equations are then applied to particular cases. Thus, 
the simple form of the relationship, as introduced by Frigg (2012) above (i.e. that 
models are instances of theory), is indeed the case here.63 
 
62 A challenge to this view is briefly discussed later in IV.IV. 
63 When confirming this relationship, only the mathematical formalism of standard quantum mechanics is 
considered, without any further explanation by the means of natural language, visualizations and so forth. 
The reference of the terms in the formalism to the physical system is, then, the matter of interpretation. 
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For transparency, I want to re-enforce the stance that only empirical observations can 
justify a theory of physics. The attitude is also shared, for example, by Hesse, who 
writes about the early equation of conduction of heat by Fourier:  
All that is necessary is to lay down the principle that the rate of flow of 
heat between two surfaces of the body is proportional to their difference of 
temperature[.] […] The only further assumption involved is that the flow 
and the temperature are continuous within the body where measurements 
cannot be made[.] […] [I]t is not necessary to enquire further into its 
nature; nothing would be added to the mathematical description in doing 
so. (Hesse 1953, 204—205.) 
To be clear, this is enforced in parallel to the view adopted in this thesis that models in 
quantum mechanics, which we are only concerned with, are indeed particular instances 
of theory.64 
Now, we are rapidly approaching the topic of interpretation, of which there is little 
direct literature in the context of quantum mechanics – the literature for “interpretations 
of quantum mechanics” is of course massive, but little attention has been paid to the 
concept itself. However, there is the clear fact that without some sort of interpretation, 
the mathematics of any physical theory would have no reference to the nature it is 
meant to predict and describe. This acknowledgement is, of course, shared by all. For 
example, Hesse writes: “All that can […] be said with certainty is that there is a 
similarity of mathematical structure between the model and the experiments[.]” (Hesse 
1953, 203.) The notion has apparent overlap with other ways of phrasing, such as 
“relationship”, “representation”, “analogy” and so forth, but what is meant at all times is 
the way we understand what the theory or the model is about. This reference is primary 
for the understanding of the concept of interpretation in any context. Whether this 
reference is true, false or something else is secondary.  
This is not a simple question. However, clarity can be found in the context of quantum 
mechanics by paying close attention to it. Some statements made by Hesse, Fürth, 
Redhead and Frigg will be returned to shortly. But first, let us inspect the notion of 
‘interpretation’ in general. The angle of approach in what follows will be: how has the 
concept been understood in philosophical literature? Is there a connection between a 
philosophical understanding of the notion and the interpretations of quantum 
mechanics? If there is, what kind of a connection is it? If not, how could interpretation 
 
64 A qualifier must be left here: this is not to say that all possible models, existing or upcoming, in 
quantum physics, necessarily fulfil this relation. I only mean that the equations of quantum mechanics, 
which we are concerned with in this thesis, do. 
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of quantum mechanics be understood? 
 
IV.II. INTERPRETATION 
IV.II.I. SEMANTICS AND INTERPRETATION 
 
The literature broaching the subject of interpretations can be roughly divided into 
semantic logic and, for the lack of a better word, the discussion of semantics of 
description65. I will comb through both – and then circle back to the discussion of 
interpretations of models. The object here is not to search for a proper definition of 
truth, but to give a best effort of a uniform description of the use of the notion of 
interpretation. In logic, it is defined as a property of a semantic system. In general, 
interpretations are related to truth conditions of sentences. 
Alfred Tarski’s work in semantics is, arguably, the widest known treatment of truth 
conditions of sentences. It is the foundation of most research in truth in modern logic as 
well. The Tarskian treatment of truth conditions – the T-model – first introduced in 
1933, can be summed up in the following way (Tarski 1936, 275—276): 
(1) A primitive statement "A" is true if, and only if, A. 
(2) "¬A" is true if, and only if, "A" is not true. 
(3) "A∧B" is true if, and only if, "A" is true and "B" is true. 
(4) "A∨B" is true if, and only if, "A" is true or "B" is true or ("A" is true 
and "B" is true). 
(5) "∀x(Fx)" is true if, and only if, for every object x "Fx" is true. 
(6) "∃x(Fx)" is true if, and only if, there is an object x for which "Fx" is 
true. 
To sum up these statements, they form a set of by which expressions can be ruled to be 
true or false. They form the axioms to which any given evaluation of truth in a sentence 
can be reduced to at the most primitive level. Of note is that for Tarski the function of 
the T-model is not to give a theory of meaning, but rather it gives the logical conditions 
for the truth values of expressions. 
As an important clarification, this is a logical theorem of truth-conditions in language 
by the means of variables and logical connectives. However, for Tarski an important 
goal was to also formulate a model-theoretic approach for evaluating the truth-
conditions of models in formal sciences. By formal, we mean deductive sciences (i.e. 
mathematics). Model theory, along the lines of Hodges (2013) means roughly the 
 
65 This is to be sharply differentiated from descriptive semantics, which, for Carnap (1948, 11) means the 
“empirical investigation of the semantical features of historically given languages”. The nature of this 
discussion has to do with the application of semantics to empirical models, which will be shown shortly. 
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following: take an arbitrary sentence S without any information of its meaning. At this 
stage, the sentence S cannot be deemed to be true or false, because an interpretation I of 
S is missing. Upon adding the interpretation I, if it makes S true, I becomes a model of 
S. Equivalent is the statement that S becomes true in I. Thus, an interpretation of S is a 
model of S, if S is true in the interpretation. From this, we get a class of interpretations 
that are models of S denoted Mod(S). Extending this to a set of sentences T we get 
Mod(T) – and here we can regard T as a set of axioms or a mathematical theory. Now, T 
and Mod(T) are to be understood as set-theoretical entities in order to explicate their 
relation to one another. 
We now have grounds for a model-theoretic definition of truth. Following66 Tarski & 
Vaught (1956): take two relational systems, here T=(B, S) and Mod(T)=(A, R), where A 
is a set of objects in T and R is the set of their relations. We also have arbitrary 
sequences 𝑥𝑛 ∈ A and a formula 𝜙. An interpretation function 𝑓(𝐼) maps Mod(T) 
isomorphically to T. Then, a sequence 𝑥𝑛 satisfies 𝜙 in Mod(T) if and only if 𝑓(𝐼(𝑥𝑛)) 
satisfies 𝜙 in T. Now, suppose we have a ‘sentence’ S belonging to T. By the 
isomorphic relation, S becomes true in Mod(T) if every sequence 𝑥𝑛 ∈ A satisfies S in 
Mod(T) (i.e. Mod(T) is a model of S). All of this is to say: we have semantic 
interpretations in the model system for the elements and relations of the object system – 
and these interpretations are understood through truth conditions.67 
The undertaking of extending model theory from formal sciences to non-formal, that is, 
empirical, will be discussed shortly. In any case, building upon Tarski’s 1933 treatment 
of truth conditions, Donald Davidson presents his account of truth-conditional 
semantics. It injects an account of meaning into Tarskian truth conditions. Davidson’s 
motivation was to give a description of how meaning and expressions are related. In his 
article “Truth and Meaning” (1967) he writes: 
While there is agreement that it is the central task of semantics to give the 
semantic interpretation (the meaning) of every sentence in the language, 
nowhere in the linguistic literature will one find, so far as I know, a 
straightforward account of how a theory performs this task, or how to tell 
when it has been accomplished. (Davidson 1967, 308.) 
 
66 Here, the definition is cut down and notations changed to be in line with previous text. This is done in 
order to get the idea of the notion of interpretation in this context; further application of this definition is 
not a goal of this thesis. 
67For further discussion on model theory, see e.g. Hodges 2013, and for Tarski’s truth theory in general, 
Hodges 2018. 
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Davidson proceeds in showing how previous circular attempts to explicate meaning can 
be circumvented. The earlier issue encountered in a Fregean tradition was, in short, that 
the meaning of a sentence was linked back to meanings of the sentence components, the 
meanings of which could not be cashed out in explanatory terms. The solution Davidson 
suggests is to map meanings to truth values of sentences, thus analysing them without 
vagueness. Davidson writes (Davidson 1967, 309): 
As a final bold step, let us try treating the position occupied by ‘p’ 
extensionally: to implement this, sweep away the obscure 'means that', 
provide the sentence that replaces ‘p’ with a proper sentential connective, 
and supply the description that replaces ‘s’ with its own predicate. The 
plausible result is 
(T) s is T if and only if p. 
Where s is the sentence, T is the interpretation of the sentence, and p is the set of truth 
conditions for the sentence. In other words, if the proposition “snow is white” is true if 
and only if snow is white, then the state of snow being white is the meaning of the 
aforementioned sentence. Here interpretation is equated with meaning – which is 
provided by Tarski’s theory of truth conditions. 
Closely related to Davidson’s Tarskian treatment, Rudolf Carnap in his “Introduction to 
Semantics” (1948) takes the set of interpretations in a semantic system as rules for 
statements within that system, which define whether a given statement is true. For 
instance, using Carnap’s example, among the conditions for a statement Pa containing 
the proposition “the Moon is spherical” is the actual fact that the Moon is spherical. In 
order for this to work, is to be noted here that to assert that a sentence is true is the same 
as asserting just the sentence. In a semantic system, the statement Pa designates this 
proposition, thus “the Moon is spherical” is an interpretation of it. Carnap writes (1948, 
22): 
By a semantical system (or interpreted system) we understand a system of 
rules, formulated in a metalanguage and referring to an object language, of 
such a kind that the rules determine a truth-condition for every sentence of 
the object language, i.e. a sufficient and necessary condition for its truth. 
In this way the sentences are interpreted by the rules, i.e. made 
understandable, because to understand a sentence, to know what is 
asserted by it, is the same as to know under what conditions it would be 
true. 
In “Introduction to Symbolic Logic and Its Applications” (1957), Carnap doubles down 
on the use of interpretation as the relation by which we understand any statement. This 
is done in the context of Carnap’s introduction of the “language B”, which, briefly 
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characterized, is a language containing connective signs, special signs, sentential 
constants, individual signs, predicates and functions. The language B, essentially, 
differs from the previously introduced language A in that where A is a purely 
syntactical system, B is additionally semantical.68 Thus, the semantical system must 
include an interpretation of the language, which is analysed in the customary truth-
conditional way. Taking an arbitrary sentence S belonging to B, an interpretation of it is 
connecting S to a truth-condition p, such that S is true if and only if p. Here, however, 
Carnap stresses also the process of creation of the interpretation – interpreting a system 
is not something done post-hoc, but which is often inseparable from the creation of the 
syntactical system. Carnap writes (1957, 101): 
One who constructs a syntactical system usually has in mind from the 
outset some interpretation of this system. (This interpretation need not 
itself have a prior representation as a semantical system; and indeed, what 
prior representation it may have is normally non-systematic.) While this 
intended interpretation can receive no explicit indication in the syntactical 
rules – since these rules must be strictly formal – the author’s intention 
respecting interpretation naturally affects his choice of the formation and 
transformation rules of the syntactical system. 
To be clear, what is in question here is the interpretation of Carnap’s theory of 
syntactical systems – this has no necessary bearing on the statements of physics. 
As the last example of authors writing on interpretations, we have Michael Dummett. 
Criticizing the truth-conditional theory, Michael Dummett argued that the meaning of 
expressions should be grounded on proof rather than truth. This is a bridge for proof-
theoretic semantics. Where Tarski and Carnap represent a classical notion of meaning – 
which separates ‘truth’ and ‘knowing the truth’. For Dummett, there is no distinction. 
Along the lines of a Fregean notion of reference, Dummett (1996, 234) writes: 
A semantic theory is not itself a theory of meaning, since it does not 
concern itself with what is known by a speaker and constitutes his grasp of 
the use of an expression: a knowledge of the meaning of a predicate does 
not consist in knowing of which objects it is true and of which it is false, 
and a knowledge of the meaning of a sentence does not consist in knowing 
its truth-value. But a semantic theory is plausible only in so far as it 
provides a base on which a theory of meaning can be constructed. The 
semantic theory seeks to exhibit the manner in which a sentence is 
determined as true, when it is true, in accordance with its composition, its 
 
68 The structure of “Introduction to Symbolic Logic” is two-fold: the first part defines an extended 
syntactic language and the second its application. The first part is further divided into three subsections: 
languages A, B and C. The language A is a simple syntactic language much in the tradition of classical 
symbolic logic. The language B introduces a semantical system on top of the base system. The extended 
language C also contains all expressions that can be made in A and B. Part two is the application of 
logical languages in non-formal context. 
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internal structure. It does so by specifying, for each type of expression, 
what has to be associated with an expression of that type in order that, for 
every true sentence in which the expression occurs, we can exhibit the 
manner in which that sentence is determined as true in accordance with its 
composition. 
Here, whether in formal or natural language, the notion of interpretation means roughly 
the following: an operation of understanding the references of objects in the given 
language. This is stated by the theory of meaning, which is built upon the base semantic 
theory. Similar to Davidson, however, interpretation is still the exact same notion as 
meaning. 
Before moving further, let us do a quick round-up. We seem to have two main lines of 
understanding of what, roughly, an interpretation is in the context of language and logic: 
1. The relation which maps truth-conditions to statements in a language (Davidson, 
Carnap and Dummett69) 
2. A structure in a metalanguage which is a model of a structure in an object 
language insofar as it makes the structure true (Tarski and model theory) 
Here, a strictly analogous attitude to sense (1) in fact makes some sense in connection to 
quantum theory. Although one must be careful when postulating connections between 
syntactical systems and scientific theories, a heuristic way to think about interpreting 
quantum theory shares some of the DNA with sense (1). One can think of a theory 
containing variables and relations, and hold that whether these are correct is decided on 
whether the theory actually predicts the phenomena connected with microscopical 
systems (i.e. these observable phenomena become, strictly analogously, the “truth-
conditions” of the theory).  
Thus, we already understand what the theory refers to in virtue of being able to use it in 
connection to empirical observations, and this understanding is what allows us to deem 
the theory as either “true” or “false”. This, albeit quite trivially, is the interpretation of 
the theory. Here, along the lines of the above Carnap quote, the interpretation is, of 
course, simultaneously known when the theory is created. However, this analogy is as 
far as one can go with this, because, for example, quantum theory and any models it 
contains are not reducible to some statements held together by some syntax – to argue 
 
69 Although Dummett distances himself from the classical treatment of meaning, the base semantic 
system still, naturally, rests on truth-conditions – thus, I will stack Dummett in this same tradition. 
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something of this ilk would be to raise the ghost of the deductive-nomological model, 
which is preferably left to rest in peace.70 
To actually get closer to the discussion of models, we need to turn to (2). Now, in the 
form presented here, this sense needs some special attention before moving forward. 
Quoting Frigg (2012), what the model-theoretic treatment means is: “If all sentences of 
a theory are true when its symbols are interpreted as referring to either objects, relations, 
or functions of a structure S, then S is a model of this theory.” Frigg continues to build a 
bridge from this to physics: “Many models in science carry over from logic the idea of 
being the interpretation of an abstract calculus. This is particularly pertinent in 
physics[…]” 
What the model-theoretic approach means to say is that a model is an interpretation of a 
theory that makes the theory true. In the model-theoretic framework, these models, as 
particular applications of the theory, are interpretations of it. The problem that one then 
faces is that there are said to be different interpretations of quantum theory. The 
consequence of this is that interpretations are different models of the theory, mapping 
the theory to different truth-conditions. What makes this situation peculiar, then, is the 
fact that a truth-condition that differs from the predictions of quantum mechanics must 
be non-empirical (assuming no experimental results that violate quantum theory are 
found). 
However, a scaffolding for interpretations can be found. First, for the sake of the 
argument, we accept the model-theoretic sense of interpretation. We can then regard 
quantum theory as an abstract collection of formulas, without reference to empirical 
observations as such. We further take models as the applications of these formulas to 
particular situations with their respective empirical observations (i.e. the “truth-
conditions”). Then the models can indeed be thought of as interpretations of theory. 
Importantly, however, this means that the model is, at the very same instant, two things: 
1. A particular application of the theory, and 
2. an understanding of how the theory refers to observations 
This line of reasoning is somewhat satisfactory. However, we know for a fact of the 
formation of quantum theory that it was constructed to describe observed phenomena – 
thus it may seem odd to require a separate notion of interpretation, or model, to connect 
 
70 The DN model follows from the idea that particular cases can be explained by the base theory by means 
of inferences. The inadequacy of this has been presented in numerous occasions. (See e.g. Woodward, 
2003.) 
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it post hoc to the very thing it was already describing. Be that as it may, in the way 
proposed above, interpretation, once again, becomes a notion of understanding the 
reference of theory to phenomena.71  
A further development was in fact attempted in order to bridge the gap between formal 
and non-formal sciences – this is to say, there was an attempt to construct a syntactical 
system for non-formal sciences which would unify the language used in them. The draw 
of this, for the purposes of the inquiry at hand, is clear – if there were a syntactical 
system encompassing physics, we should not have any difficulties in deciding what the 
interpretations of theories in physics are. Next, I will briefly go over this attempt. 
 
IV.II.II. MODEL THEORY AND DESCRIPTION 
  
Carnap, in “Introduction to Semantics” (1948), introduces a distinction between logical 
and descriptive signs. As logical, we of course take connectives, operators and such. As 
descriptive, we take classified names of items, signs descripting empirical properties, 
empirical functions and so forth. This is done in order to build a bridge from strictly 
logical languages to languages describing the empirical world. But a more ambitious 
project is, already, on the horizon for Carnap – extending descriptive expressions to a 
system of general semantics: 
So far we have discussed the distinction between logical and descriptive 
expressions only in the form in which it appears when we have to do with 
a particular semantical system, in other words, as a question of special 
semantics. The problem is more difficult in the form it takes in general 
semantics. Here it is the question whether and how ‘logical’ and 
‘descriptive’ can be defined on the basis of other semantical terms, e.g. 
‘designation’ and ‘true’, so that the application of the general definition to 
any particular system will lead to a result which is in accordance with the 
intended distinction. A satisfactory solution is not yet known. (Carnap 
1948, 59.) 
Carnap gives a shot at such a language in his later “Introduction to Symbolic Logic and 
its Applications” (1957). The first part of the book introduces three languages, A, B and 
C, and the second part their application to descriptive situations. In order to do this, 
 
71 It is again of importance to emphasize that no theory of “how models refer to the world” is attempted in 
any way in this thesis, although some pointers are inevitably found. I will also emphasize that theories of 
physics have a relationship to measurements without any need to discuss reality itself further. Moreover, 
the main goal of the undergoing treatment is to isolate a proper definition, or at the very least some 
boundaries, for the notion of ‘interpretation’. Some commitments have to be made in order to do this 
properly; the most significant is the commitment to the view that in quantum mechanics models are 
mathematical formulations applied to particular use cases. 
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Carnap introduces “the axiomatic method”, which is derived from the standard idea of 
axioms being self-evident truths and theorems being derived from axioms. However, 
Carnap states that in an axiomatic system (AS) of scientific language, arbitrary 
sentences may be selected as axioms. An AS is formulated in conjunction with a basic 
language of the AS which Carnap calls “language L”. When an axiomatic system is 
stated,  it is assumed that the interpretation of its language L is understood. Carnap 
writes:  
When an interpretation of the primitives is given, the remaining axiomatic 
constants straightway receive an interpretation through their definitions[.] 
(Carnap 1957, 172.) 
Here, we get the distinction between logical and descriptive. If all the primitives in an 
axiomatic system are interpreted as logical constants, we have a logical interpretation 
of the AS. Conversely, if we have any other interpretation belonging to the AS, we have 
a descriptive interpretation. The notion of “model” is analysed in the same vein as 
before in the model-theoretic treatment. However, Carnap recognizes that the situation 
changes when we are dealing with models of, for instance, empirical theory: 
By a model (more specifically, a logical or mathematical model) for the 
axiomatic primitive constants of a given AS with respect to a given 
domain D of individuals we mean a value assignment VA to these 
primitives such that both D and VA are specified without the use of 
descriptive constants. A model is said to be a model of the AS provided it 
satisfies all the axioms of the AS. […] The study of models is simpler than 
that of interpretations, since it deals with extensions, not intensions; e.g. 
with classes, not properties. Logical interpretations are essentially the 
same as models. […] However, if we are interested in the use of a given 
AS in fields of empirical science, e.g. physics, economics, etc., or in the 
construction of an AS as a formal representation of a given scientific 
theory, then we have to consider descriptive interpretations. (Carnap 1957, 
173.) 
The extension of models to empirical sciences was later on picked up especially by 
Apostel in his 1961 his paper “Towards the Formal Study of Models in the Non-Formal 
Sciences”. Here, Apostel acknowledges Carnap’s distinction of logical and descriptive 
interpretations, and uses this as the basis of studying the possibility of a formal theory 
of empirical models. The division cuts at the level of variables in a given syntax, or, in 
Carnap’s terminology, calculus. Here, the variables in the calculus are logical, if their 
range of values is defined strictly in the logical system. Contrastingly, they are 
descriptive, if their range is defined in a descriptive expression in the metalanguage. 
This is a natural entryway for the notion of interpretation in the context of scientific 
models, as it can be treated as the descriptive relation from the metalanguage to the 
68 
 
model. A summarization of the difference between the two is given by Apostel (1961, 
132): 
An interpretation is a true interpretation if whenever a sentence implies 
another in the calculus, in the interpretation whenever the first sentence is 
true, the second is equally true, and whenever a sentence is refutable in the 
calculus, it is false in the model. Such a true interpretation is a logically 
true interpretation, if the sentences that become true, become logically 
true. An interpretation is a factual interpretation if it is not a logical 
interpretation. An interpretation is a descriptive interpretation if at least 
one of the undefined signs of the calculus becomes in the interpretation a 
descriptive sign[.] 
Apostel wants to outline a unification of all kinds of models in some formal way. Of 
course, we are not interested in this goal here as such, but the procedure of constructing 
a formal framework for empirical models, necessarily, involves some formal notion of 
their interpretation as well. Additionally, in this framework, there has to be some sort of 
treatment of the phenomena in quantum mechanics. Moving forward with the 
framework of empirical models, Apostel recognizes the problem of overdetermination 
with the idea of models being any interpretations of a theory that made the theory true. 
A natural example of this is the very existence of non-standard models in science (such 
as those in quantum mechanics). What becomes then relevant is the selection of not just 
any model, but an intended model of the theory. There is an important connection here 
to our problem of two different interpretations of quantum theory. We will return to this 
shortly.  
Recall that we are using the notion of model in the model-theoretic sense as discussed 
above. Here, the basis for the definition of model is of the following kind: taking again 
a theory T, we define for it a model M, with the conditions that there exists a structure 
N, which is a set of observations with a certain relation to M, and is generally 
homomorphic to the class of all models K on T. This does not solve the problem of the 
intended model but it has an important characteristic – in formal model theory, the M of 
T is the same as the set of conditions which make T true (i.e. the “true-making 
interpretation”, as it were). Here, M is examined in reference to N, which is a set of 
observations. Moreover, to avoid irrelevant discussion of scientific realism in this 
context, we use notions such as, to quote Apostel, “propositions of the formalism are 
verified72” with regards to the observations. The reason we need the set N is because no 
 
72 The notion “verified”, of course, does not imply a commitment to verificationism, but just that our 
theory “checks out” as we observe the predictions it makes. 
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empirical theory can be said to completely describe the world, or, completely describe 
(in whatever sense of the word) the domain it refers to. If this were the case, we could 
just say that the world is the model of the theory. This is considered by Apostel (1961, 
133): 
[I]t is clear that the concept of model in the empirical sciences, when it is 
used in the following context ‘the world is a model of our sciences, in as 
far as these sciences are true’ (or conversely the aim of science is to 
construct a calculus for which reality is the only model) takes the concept 
‘model’ in the sense of a factual and descriptive true interpretation. 
We will not venture further into the possibility of a formal theory of empirical models 
(regarding quantum theory or any other theory), but some important notes are taken on 
board. Apostel’s idea of models as the intermediary between theory and the world is in 
line with the view of quantum-mechanical models as particular instances of theory, as 
accepted in the context of Fürth’s functional models.73 Now, we can start building a 
picture: 
1. There is the quantum theory, which, while of course not in any practical way 
disconnected from the world it is built to describe, can be thought of an abstract 
formalism. 
2. This formalism is then to be measured against the world in the way we interpret 
its reference. 
3. In order to do this, we apply the theory to particular instances where 
observations are being made. Thus, we get a model, from the theory, to the 
particular case, and this particular model, then, predicts the kinds of results we 
will obtain. Here, we have interpreted the theory for this situation. 
4. Upon obtaining the predicted results, we see that the model checks out, and, as 
the model is a direct application of theory, the theory is verified (once again). 
5. As an obvious consequence, we see that we have both interpreted the theory, 
and interpreted it in the way that verifies it. 
However, from this is still omitted the fact that, once we get the model for the particular 
situation, we also interpret the model in connection to observation. This point might not 
be of crucial significance, because the complete interpretation of theory in connection to 
any particular observational situation takes place at once when the theory is applied. In 
any case, let us turn to models in physics for the last time. 
 
73 By this statement, of course, no such argument is made that would defend the idea of model theory as 
proper means of formalizing models of quantum mechanics – or any semantical or syntactical system for 
that matter. 
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IV.II.III. MODELS AND INTERPRETATION – ROUND TWO 
 
As a convenient summary of the discussion referenced in the preceding sections, 
Apostel sketches the relationships between theories, models and interpretations for 
empirical sciences (Apostel 1961, 127): 
Models are then introduced to constitute the bridge between the theoretical 
and observational levels, the theoretical predicates being interpretable as 
predicates of the model and the observational predicates being also 
interpretable as predicates of the model, the model furnishing lawful 
relationships between the two interpretations. 
Here, we can equate “observational level” to the physical phenomena that models are 
taken to represent. This can be put in other words: as the scientist is crafting a theory 
that unifies the physical phenomena she has observed, she creates a model containing 
the objects and relations she interprets the phenomena to have. The interpretation of 
these objects and relations in the ‘model reality’ coincides with the interpretation of 
objects and relations of the empirical world. This process is, of course, not arbitrary, but 
governed by what she can observe and distinguish in the empirical world. Fürth (1966, 
329) expands on this relation: 
When a definite connection has been established between the parameters 
describing a functional model, and those of the real physical system it is 
meant to represent, the next step must be to try to ‘verify’ by means of 
measurements on the real system, whether the mathematical law for the 
model describes the behaviour of the real system correctly; only if the 
mathematical relationship is confirmed by the measurements without 
exception can it be considered to constitute a physical law. 
The scientist, of course, has only limited means for establishing these relations – for 
example, any physical measurement has a limited degree of accuracy which directly 
influences both model-creation and what can be said to be known from the model. Fürth 
writes further: 
Thus any statement about verification must be accompanied by a 
statement on the degree of accuracy of the type of measurements which 
were used for the purpose of verification. If the equations for the model 
correctly describe the relationships between the various parameters of the 
real system within the stated degree of accuracy then the equations are 
verified, and the model may be regarded as an appropriate representation 
of a physical reality on a certain level of observational technique. (Fürth 
1966, 329). 
What, then, happens when a model is able to correspond to all the physical phenomena 
it is meant to but also exhibits other kinds of objects or structures which are not 
observational? Fürth argues that these represent “more parameters than necessary”: 
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[O]ne of the fundamental principles of quantum physics maintains that 
there exists a natural and ultimate limit for the accuracy with which any 
observation can be carried out. If this tenet is accepted as true, the just 
mentioned process [referring to advances in measurement accuracy] can 
not be continued beyond this limit, and as the ‘uncertainty principle’ is 
actually built into the basic equations of quantum mechanics, no explicit 
statement concerning the degree of accuracy of the measurements need be 
made for the purpose of the verification of the mathematical relationship 
that apply to a functional model constructed on quantum mechanical 
principles. 
From this point of view it would appear to be superfluous to invent models 
containing a greater number of parameters than strictly necessary for the 
complete description of a physical system with the ultimate limit of 
accuracy demanded by the quantum mechanical principles … [I]f the 
uncertainty principle is supposed to be correct then the very notion of ‘real 
physical laws’, underlying the laws that are verifiable by observations 
with ultimate degree of accuracy, become meaningless. (Fürth 1966, 330.) 
The notion of “meaningless” aside, as well as the apparent circularity in arguing for a 
natural limit of accuracy74, here we actually have a proposition of a solution to the 
problem of the intended model, as discussed previously. Fürth’s tactic would be to 
appeal to the parameters in the model and their relation to our capabilities to measure 
them. Any parameters that are not necessary to connect the model to actual results 
become superfluous (there is an obvious connection to Heisenberg’s phrasing here!) – 
and such should be left out from the intended model.  
Even if this might bring to mind a kind of hand-wavy positivism seen in chapter III, 
here we have in fact, with some adjustments75, some kind of a philosophical argument 
as opposed to a simple dismissal. An intended model is such that it connects the theory 
to phenomena, and we need some kind of a criterion to pick the intended model from 
the class of all models verifying the theory. Thus the model which has only the 
necessary parameters for correct predictions is, at the very least, closer to the intended 
model. If we take models in the model-theoretic sense, there is an extension to 
interpretations here as well. 
 
74 To state with conviction that the uncertainty principle is physically fundamental, in some way or 
another, is as unwarranted by quantum theory than anything else. Bohm writes (1957, 64): “Thus, the 
conclusion that there is no deeper level of causally determined motion is just a piece of circular reasoning, 
since it will follow only if we assume beforehand that no such level exists.” He is right. 
75 See the previous footnote. This kind of an argument cannot base itself in the fundamentality of the 
uncertainty principle if it is understood in terms of physical reality rather than quantum theory. However, 
if we refer to the theoretical structure of quantum theory itself (connected to the predictions it is able to 
ultimately produce), we can cash out the preferences for the model. 
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Something similar is taken up by Hesse in her 1954 paper. In her concluding remarks, 
Hesse states (Hesse 1954, 214): 
Not only has each model an indefinite number of pointers, but since there 
is an indefinite number of ways of adding to the mathematical structure 
which forms the basis of the analogy, there is also an indefinite number of 
different models of any given physical situation, each having the same set 
of formal rules, but having different pointers, some of which may 
contradict the others. … Short of some metaphysical postulate of the unity 
of nature there is no a priori reason why light should behave in the least 
like particles or waves, or why the fundamental particles (even the name 
indicates how far analogy permeates our thinking) should behave like 
gravitating planets or electrified pith-balls, or indeed in any way that can 
be described by existing mathematical theories. 
Neither Hesse nor Fürth ascribe explicitly to any semantical or model-theoretic view of 
formal models. Moreover, Hesse does not here give any proposition of an intended 
model, explicitly or otherwise. But she warns about misconstruing a physical situation 
from a model situation, due to previous experience and intuitions leading the model-
builder, or interpreter, astray. This brings somewhat to mind Heisenberg’s remarks 
quoted in chapter II. Furthermore, it is, once more and finally, echoed by Fürth in the 
discussion of scale models (Fürth 1966, 337): 
“The fact that it became necessary to ascribe both particle and wave 
properties to field and matter is usually interpreted as expressing and 
inherent duality in nature. In my opinion this interpretation is not correct. 
As already emphasized, the notions of particles and waves are taken from 
macroscopic experience. Both notions may be used for constructing scale 
models of physical systems in atomic dimensions in order to visualize 
physical processes in these dimensions. But one must not be surprised to 
find that they eventually become incompatible when one reaches sub-
atomic dimension, and that one is forced to use one or the other according 
to the observational situation if one insists in using scale models even 
then.” 
This is more or less equivalent to the discussion in chapter II about wave and particle 
pictures and their respective limitations. Of note here is that in this quote Fürth is using 
the word interpretation in the sense it is used in the context of “interpretations of 
quantum mechanics”, not in the more technical sense we are striving towards here. 
In any case, a crucial understanding of interpretations is demonstrated in Mary Hesse’s 
later treatment of model analogies. In her 1970 paper “Models and Analogies in 
Science” she defends the notion of formal analogies. Shortly put, formal analogies are 
two or more different cases of reality that can be described by the same model. For 
example, trigonometric functions can model a number of different physical phenomena 
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involving swinging, rotating or orbital motion as well as continuous alternating 
acceleration of any quantity. Thus, two cases are formal analogies if they can be 
observed to comply with the same model. Hesse writes (1970, 99): 
[I]f we regard a valid argument by analogy from models as essentially a 
transfer of causal relations between some characters from one side of the 
analogy relation to the other, it follows that the interpretation of theoretical 
terms we have just given is presupposed in the argument, even if not 
explicitly referred to, for if there is a theory about the causal relations in 
model (2), then the same theory holds for the relevant characters in model 
(1), and hence for the explanatory theory being sought. 
The insight of presupposition is, again, important for the subject matter of quantum 
theory as well. Whenever a scientist is creating a model, whether the model is 
understood in the model-theoretic sense or otherwise, its interpretation is presupposed 
by her understanding of the observables she is modelling. Thus, interpretation isn’t a 
case of a posteriori mapping of meanings to a pre-existing model but is already 
assumed to all objects and relations in the model. This is similar to the way that a 
person giving a sound argument by analogy presupposes the interpretations of the 
theoretical terms she refers to. At this point, it is reasonable to conclude, at least for our 
purposes in quantum theory, the following: a model is always interpreted – and its 
interpretation is included when the model, or theory for that matter, is built. This is 
concordant with all senses of ‘model’ we have discussed. 
With this interim conclusion in place, it is time to wrap up what we can say about 
interpretations in the context of quantum mechanics. Next, I will present outlines for 
what an interpretation is and consider some counterarguments. 
 
IV.III. A DEFINITION OF “INTERPRETATION” 
 
Let us practice, once again, some rough categorization. All relevant senses of the notion 
of interpretation, with any kind of proper definition, can be primarily divided into two 
senses: 
1. Semantical notions about the relation between a structure and its conditions, and 
2. the ways theory and/or models are understood to refer to phenomena 
As is instantly obvious from the preceding discussion, these are more often than not the 
same notion. Indeed, this categorization is put in place only to account for the use cases 
of interpretation where a semantical theory is not ascribed to by the author. Be that as it 
may, immediately pertaining to the discussion now examined, a set of statements is 
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made in order to outline the notion of interpretation used in the domain of quantum 
theory. Many ques are taken from semantics and especially from model theory. The idea 
of extending interpretation from formal to non-formal sciences has been adopted from 
Carnap and Apostel. 
However, no commitments to some syntactical system or some formal theory of models 
are made here. Moreover, the point of the following statements is not to fix the meaning 
of “interpretation” in some formal way or to some formal framework, but to suggest a 
definition based on how the term has been used in the relevant literature. The definition 
is composed of eight statements: 
ID1. The notion ‘interpretation’ refers to, in all cases, to what we take any sign, 
expression, statement, model, theory, etc. to mean. 
ID2. In the context of quantum theory, interpretation operates solely in reference to 
manipulation and observation of physical phenomena. 
ID3. If quantum theory is applied in some specific physical situation, the theory is 
simultaneously interpreted. 
ID4. The interpretation is presupposed in any application of the theory. 
ID5. If quantum theory contains any model, the model is the particular application of 
formalism in the theory to a particular physical situation. 
ID6. The act of model application is simultaneously the act of interpretation of 
theory. 
ID7. The interpretation is confirmed if, when applied as a model to a situation the 
theory is interpreted to refer to, the formalism of the theory makes correct 
predictions about the components in the model. 
ID8. Equivalently, the theory is verified, if it is interpreted into a model of a specific 
situation, and the model is confirmed by correct predictions about its 
components.76 
Statements (ID1)-(ID4) are intentionally formulated in a way which does not necessitate 
the notion of ‘model’. Conversely, statements (ID5)-(ID8) define the model as a product 
of interpretation. However, the view that a true interpretation equals a model, as is often 
the structure of formal model theory77, is not adopted. This is because ‘interpretation’, 
at least for our intents and purposes, is an operational term, whereas ‘model’ is an 
abstract structure. From (ID5) and (ID6), however, we understand that if a model is at 
 
76 The notions confirmation and verification here require some explication. Confirmation in this context 
means that the interpretation of the theory is seen to be right in the most practical level – nothing above or 
around this sense is implied. For example, a physics student has the right interpretation of the Schrödinger 
equation if she is able to use it to correctly give a solution to a problem in a physics exam. ‘Confirmation’ 
is simply seeing that the theoretical content was correctly understood. Verification, equivalently, means 
that the theory is demonstrated to correctly produce the relevant predictions for the physical situation it is 
interpreted to refer to. ‘Verification’ has no implications for the theory to be ‘true’ in any stronger sense 
than what is defined here. 
77 See IV.II.II. The idea is that an interpretation I which makes all statements of theory T true is a model 
of T.  
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any time formed, it necessarily implies interpretation. I will only define this direction of 
implication, as it is not strictly necessary to state anything about interpretations 
implying models.78 
Statement (ID1) serves to fix the operational nature of the notion of interpretation in 
general. Statement (ID2) gives the conditions for interpreting an abstract structure in 
quantum theory (i.e. restricts its domain to physically observable phenomena). 
Statement (ID3) fixes the act of interpretation (both logically and temporally) to theory 
application. The first half ends with statement (ID4), which states that interpretation 
precedes application. Now, (ID3) and (ID4) are very similar, but (ID4) is added to fix 
the said logical order. 
In (ID7), we have the notion of interpretation confirmation. This can be stated so that if 
one understands the theory correctly, one applies the theory correctly. Thus, in the case 
of correct application, their interpretation of the theory is confirmed. In (ID8) we have 
the odder expression of the verification of a theory. By this, no commitments are made 
to verificationist projects of scientific justification. The term is used in the following 
trivial sense: if the theory checks out, i.e. it predicts phenomena correctly, we say by 
(ID7) and (ID8) that both the interpretation of the theory has been correct and the theory 
itself produces correct predictions. 
This set of statements does not include one that says something about the theory being 
interpreted simultaneously with its construction. Although this is, of course, the case 
with quantum theory, such a concept is not necessary, having introduced the eight 
statements above, for a sufficient understanding of interpretations to come out. 
Special attention is now paid to the expression “predictions about the components in the 
model”. This is included in order to further fix the reference of the model to physical 
phenomena. It is a proposed field-specific solution to the supposed problem of the 
intended model in quantum theory: the intended model is unavoidably designated by 
observations, because the components in the model are the ones that are compared 
against the measurements, not just models as simple entities. By components, we mean 
variables, constants, operators, functions etc., and any mathematical relations formed by 
these, partially isolated, as the complete form of the model, or in any other 
 
78 It can be argued that a given interpretation is evaluable only if it is represented in some way, and this 
representation can always be thought of as a model. This would mean that an interpretation always 
implies a model. However, for my argument concerning the nature of interpretation it is not required to 
say anything of this. 
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configuration. Consequently, a component can be a single term, or a system of multiple 
terms – which is to say, a system of components is also a component in the model. As 
result of this, observations can, in a very idealized (and fictional) example, confirm a 
single component in the model, i.e. from measurements it can be ascertained that the 
model predicts them, but the model cannot be, by the means of measurements, analyzed 
further to say something, for example, about the physical meaning or causal relations of 
its constituents. Thus, the model is confirmed, but only as this single component. 
We’ll call these components in this context simply model components. The model 
components themselves can be at this stage evaluated against their physical references, 
because a model is the result of interpretation. Model components are thus not simply 
technical expressions, but also statements about what the target system is like. These 
statements are then evaluated against empirical observations.  
Of note is that the use of the notion ‘component’ here is completely isolated to serve 
this purpose only. It is separate from any other possible use cases in similar or different 
contexts. The motivation for the use of this notion is only to give more detail to the 
following general idea: the correctness of the model is evaluated against what it says 
about its target system. Thus, the intention behind any model, expression etc. plays a 
significant part on which model components are evaluated and in which way. 
If observational means allow for isolating model components (as is, of course, the case 
up to the limit imposed by the uncertainty principle), whether single terms or partially 
isolated systems, then model confirmation for multiple components in the model is 
attained. In this case, the model is confirmed both for a single component, and also for 
some sub-components participating in the construction of the most general component. 
Of course, in the application of any model, we already know the predictions it makes in 
relation to measurements.79 Consequently, we can study the model and its observation-
corresponding components without any actual experimentation (we can thank one 
hundred years of quantum mechanics for this). Let us look at this more closely and take 
up the example of the quantum tunneling situation once more. As before, we get for the 
subtraction of potential and initial energy: 
𝑈 − 𝐸 < 0 ⇒ 𝑘2 = −
2𝑚
ℏ2
(𝑈 − 𝐸)     𝑎𝑛ⅆ     𝑈 − 𝐸 > 0 ⇒ 𝑞2 =
2𝑚
ℏ2
(𝑈 − 𝐸) 
 
79 As a clarification: a proper prediction is such that allows one to state, before experimentation, what 
exactly has been predicted. 
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Here, the term on the left refers to the wave function outside the potential barrier and 
the term on the right to the wave function in it. Again, U80 stands for potential, E for the 
energy of the wave packet, and m for the particle’s mass.  
Now, the classic example of quantum tunneling in practice is the use of scanning 
tunneling microscopes (STM’s). Here, I will follow Julian Chen’s Introduction to 
Scanning Tunneling Microscopy (2007). STM is used to create images of objects’ 
surfaces at the atomic level (up to the definition of 0.1 nm). In STM, a conducting tip 
(made out of tungsten or platinum-iridium) is brought extremely close (to the distance 
of well under one nanometer) to the sample object’s surface. The tip is connected to 
three perpendicular piezoelectric transducers81, corresponding to x, y and z-axises. In 
our case, the z-axis is perpendicular to the sample object’s surface. A sawtooth voltage 
is introduced to the x-piezo, and a ramp voltage to the y-piezo, causing the tip to ‘scan’ 
the xy-plane. At this distance, the wave functions of the electrons in the tip overlap with 
the wavefunctions of the objects’ surface.  
A bias voltage (meaning the threshold voltage for, in this case, the operation of 
tunneling to actualize) of around ±0.01𝑉 − ±2𝑉 is introduced in reference to the 
sample object’s surface. This allows for a tunneling current between the tip and the 
sample surface. If the bias voltage in the sample is V>0, the electrons from the tip 
tunnel to the sample (or, more precisely, to the empty states in the sample), and if V<0, 
the other way around. This current is then conducted from the tip to an amplifier. The 
current is then converted to a value of voltage, and the attained value is used to form a 
direct feedback loop with the piezoelectric transducer in the z-axis. In order to drive the 
z-piezo, the current is compared to a reference value. If, for example, the actual current 
is larger than the reference, the z-piezo is controlled, by application of voltage, to 
withdraw the tip further from the sample’s surface, and vice versa. This process 
eventually establishes a proper definition. 
From the current, then, we get z-values (converted by a certain formula to the metric 
system) for the xy-plane, which – for just the x-dimension – look like this: 
 
80 The letter U is used this time in order to not confuse the potential barrier with bias voltage. 
81 A piezoelectric transducer is an object which contracts or expands when a voltage is introduced. 
Symmetrically, introducing a mechanical force to the object creates a voltage in it. These transducers are 
used to control the tip: when a sawtooth voltage is applied in one axis and a ramp voltage in the other, it is 
hopefully clear to see which kind of motion the tip itself makes in the xy-plane. 
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Figure 6: A plot of one-dimensional z-values in STM. (Chen 2007, 2.) 
This plot is then interpreted as peaks representing atoms and valleys representing empty 
space. Now, with instrumentation out of the way, let’s look at the quantum mechanics 
of the situation. The terms given above are, of course, solutions of the Schrödinger 
equation of form (to be clear, we are considering this case one-dimensionally in the z-
axis): 
𝜓(𝑧) = 𝜓(0)ⅇ±ⅈ𝑘𝑧 
Inside the potential barrier the solution is of the form 𝑞2. This term describes the decay 
of the wave packet inside the barrier. As before, we get the probability density of 
observing the electron at location z from 
𝜌 = 𝜓∗𝜓 = |𝜓(0)|2ⅇ−2𝑘𝑧. 
Now, of course, the vacuum between the sample surface and the tip is an insulator, 
which creates a potential barrier between the two. If the distance between the two 
surfaces is too large, their respective wavefunctions decay into the vacuum and the 
tunnelling probability exponentially approaches zero. At a correct distance, however, 
some wave packets are transmitted through the barrier. We now define the Fermi level, 
which is the maximum number of occupied states in a metal, using the work function 𝜙 
as the reference point: 
𝐸𝐹 = −𝜙, 
where 𝜙 is the amount of energy required to release an electron from an object’s surface 
into the vacuum. What this means is that in order to pass through the potential barrier 
classically, the energy state of an individual electron should be 𝐸𝑁 = 𝐸𝐹 + 𝜙, thus the 
“height” of the potential barrier is defined by the work function. However, when the 
bias voltage is introduced, we get for an individual wave packet: 
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±[(𝐸𝐹 − ⅇ𝑉) ≤ 𝐸𝑁 ≤ 𝐸𝐹], 
and we can observe tunnelling from the occupied states in one surface to the empty 
states in the other. Keep in mind that the voltage bias introduced is much smaller than 
the work function. Now, we can introduce a transmission coefficient for the current that 
has been formed, which is the ratio between all wave packets “hitting” the potential 
barrier and those that penetrate it. Defining it from the sample surface to the scanning 
tip, we get: 
𝑇 ≡
𝐼(𝑧)
𝐼(0)
= ⅇ−2𝑞𝑧. 
We get the initial current I(0) directly from the bias voltage, and the current at I(z) by 
reading the tip. Knowing that the potential barrier is defined by the work function, we 
now get for q: 
𝑞2 =
2𝑚𝜙
ℏ
. 
Knowing that this defines the decay of the wave packet inside the wave barrier, a 
numerical value for the decay constant may be derived. Further knowing that electrons 
can only tunnel to compatible empty states and applying geometry in reference to the 
xy-plane, the tunnelling current can be associated with the density of filled or empty 
states in the sample object’s surface. A further exposé of the physics involved is not 
presented here, as this outlining suffices for our purposes. 
At this stage the reader might be curious as to why they were just given a lecture on 
STM. This is all done to illustrate model components in this particular application of 
quantum theory. First up, we have the wave function, which gives the solution for wave 
packet decay in the barrier. This solution, of course, is derived from the Schrödinger 
equation for the wave function inside a potential U. The decay constant is then used to 
calculate the transmission ratio, which is a statistical term defined by current. Here, we 
are able to say something about the components involved in our models.  
Our observations primarily confirm components such as the transmission ratio. The 
transmission ratio, on the right side of the equation, is defined by the wave function, 
which has its solution for q from the Schrödinger equation. Thus, we are able to confirm 
that the solution for q is correct, because it correctly predicts the expectation of 
transmission. Furthermore, we are able to say the following: 1) that this transmission 
occurs in the model because of wave packet overlap, and 2) from the rate of decay we 
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know when the potential barrier is narrow enough for transmission to occur. The 
component z is, then, in conjunction with other components, confirmed to model 
whether any transmission is to be expected. This is also to say that the model 
component of ‘wave packet overlap’ is required to produce the correct predictions – in 
this model – whether any physical wave packets were present or not.  
We are able to say something about the wave function as well. From it, we get the 
expectation values that are used in defining current I(z). Because of its waveform, we 
are able to say, without commitment to else than prediction and manipulation of the 
system, that the wave function gives the probability amplitudes in the situation. (The 
probabilistic interpretation is already assumed in forming of the model.)  
However, there is no possibility of interpreting the wave function as a physical entity, as 
no such component can be found from the utilized model. In other words, no such 
predictions are made by the model which had something to do with the ontological 
nature of the wave function.82 A realistic counterargument to the preceding might be 
presented in the following way: the wave function is able to give the correct probability 
amplitudes only if it is a physical entity itself. However, the proponent of such an 
argument would need to somehow show that there exists a necessary connection 
between a given physical phenomenon and a model that correctly predicts it. This 
ontological commitment would also require one to explain away all the instances where 
a model of one system was used in predicting the behaviour of some other, completely 
different system (as discussed in IV.I.). 
By this treatment, we understand the intended model as a successful application of 
theory, in which we are only considering the predictions in regard to measurements in a 
given physical situation. In the STM example, we interpret the base quantum theory in a 
very simple way – the quantum tunnelling case can be immediately seen from the 
Schrödinger equation – and map the formalism to phenomena successfully. However, 
from the equations presented above, it might not yet be very clear what kind of 
components in an otherwise predictive model are not confirmed – this is because the 
interpretation here is minimal. One of such components would be, if separately argued 
 
82 There is some contention to this, stemming from a somewhat related experiment. In the Aharonov-
Bohm effect, an electrically charged particle is affected by electromagnetic potential despite the particle 
being in a region where both magnetic and electric fields are zero (Aharonov & Bohm 1959). The 
possibility of a physical electromagnetic potential has then been linked to quantum potential (Philippidis, 
Bohm & Kaye 1982). However, a quantum-mechanical solution to this phenomenon has also been 
presented (Pearle & Rizzi 2017a, Pearle & Rizzi 2017b). 
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for, the existence of a real wave between the surface and the tip. Importantly, while the 
component “wave function” is confirmed, the component “wave” is not – this is the 
boundary of our epistemic access. A situation where these components arise more 
clearly is discussed in the next section. 
The ideas proposed here are not exactly novel. Asher Peres, in his 1978 paper 
“Unperformed experiments have no results”, writes, in reference to the Bell inequality 
and hidden variable theories: 
There are two possible attitudes in the face of these results. One is to say 
that it is illegitimate to speculate about unperformed experiments. […] For 
instance, it is not possible to formulate the EPR paradox. (Peres 1978, 
746). 
Regarding the problem of the intended model, a similar argument is in fact presented by 
Putnam in his 1980 paper “Models and Reality”. The paper discusses intended models 
in model theory but arrives at similar conclusions with this thesis. The problem Putnam 
addresses is the Löwenheim-Skolem paradox, which is roughly the following: every 
countable non-contradictory set theory has a countable model, but, from the same 
axioms, it is possible to derive a statement that says that there exists an uncountable set. 
Consequently, or so it seems, it is possible that a countable model satisfies the sentence 
“there are uncountable sets”. Because a model of a theory is such an interpretation 
which makes all the statements of the theory true, a countable model is contradictory 
with this statement. 
The main point here is that, strictly in the formal system, different (and contradictory) 
models can be derived (i.e. interpreted) from the same theory. Without delving further 
into the mathematics, the crux of the issue is, according Putnam, what we take to be the 
meaning of a sentence. The problem arises when set-theoretical terms are treated as 
having independent existence (i.e. in realist terms) – but when they are tied to use and 
what we know of their reference and the world no paradoxes appear. Putnam writes 
(1980, 481): 
The problem, however, lies with the predicament itself. The predicament 
only is a predicament because we did two things: first, we gave an account 
of under- standing the language in terms of programs and procedures for 
using the language (what else?); then, secondly, we asked what the 
possible "models" for the language were, thinking of the models as 
existing "out there" independent of any description. At this point, 
something really weird had already happened, had we stopped to notice. 
On any view, the understanding of the language must determine the 
reference of the terms, or, rather, must determine the reference given the 
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context of use. If the use, even in a fixed context, does not determine 
reference, then use is not understanding. The language, on the perspective 
we talked ourselves into, has a full program of use; but it still lacks an 
interpretation. 
The main point is that there are no “realist” truth-conditions for any statement. From 
formal set theory, then, we get very close to our understanding of interpretation of 
quantum theory (Putnam 1980, 481— 482): 
To adopt a theory of meaning according to which a language whose whole 
use is specified still lacks something - viz. its "interpretation"- is to accept 
a problem which can only have crazy solutions. To speak as if this were 
my problem, "I know how to use my language, but, now, how shall I 
single out an interpretation?" is to speak nonsense. Either the use already 
fixes the "interpretation" or nothing can. 
Some very important remarks need to be made here. Firstly, Putnam’s argumentation, if 
applied directly to our case, seems to say that the interpretation of theory is already 
fixed once the theory is formed. Although this is arguably the case with quantum theory 
as well, this line of argumentation is not strictly required here. Secondly, the idea of 
confirming components in a model against observations might seem to run against 
Putnam’s argumentation, as he further writes (Putnam 1980, 482): 
Nor do "causal theories of reference", etc., help. Basically, trying to get 
out of this predicament by these means is hoping that the world will pick 
one definite extension for each of our terms even if we cannot. But the 
world does not pick models or interpret languages. We interpret our 
languages or nothing does. 
However, there is no contradiction here. The models, if the notion of models is needed, 
are interpretations of a theory – consequently model confirmations are confirmations 
about the interpretation of a theory being correct. Obviously, the theory itself, in the 
form it is in, is made by people. The theory is, however, only possible to construct in 
reference to physical phenomena. This is to say: while we assign the reference of our 
theories, the reference can only be assigned to what can be perceived of the world. To 
be clear: here we are very far from any kind of causal theory of reference. 
Next, the “interpretations of quantum theory” are examined in light of the conclusions 
made here. 
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IV.IV. INTERPRETATIONS OF QUANTUM THEORY 
 
Now, finally, the attention turns back to the problem presented in III.III., namely, the 
dispute between (OEE) and (CO&H).83 Let us look at the two interpretations presented 
in this thesis – namely the Copenhagen interpretation and the de Broglie-Bohm 
interpretation – in light of what is now outlined as the notion of interpretation of 
quantum theory. 
It needs to be stressed that ‘Copenhagen’ is an umbrella term which is not well defined. 
As was made clear in chapter II, the version addressed here is based on the work done 
by Heisenberg and Bohr in the 1920’s and 30’s. It also needs to be noted that the notion 
of “interpretation” is, from the get-go, problematic, as it was not used by Heisenberg or 
Bohr – Heisenberg referred to the “Copenhagen geist of quantum theory” (Heisenberg 
1930, preface). And, as seen in chapter II, there is really nothing on top of the standard 
quantum theory here. The notion “Copenhagen attitude” will be consequently used here. 
The Copenhagen attitude includes, at least, these statements regarding the nature of 
quantum theory: 
CS1. The uncertainty relations point to a fundamental uncertainty84 which cannot be 
circumvented. 
CS2. No unobserved quantities of a theory have physical meaning. 
CS3. If a calculation is used to generate the physical history of the electron, it is not a 
matter of science but of personal belief. 
CS4. The wave and particle pictures are not to be taken as physical realities of a quantum-
physical system. 
CS5. The phenomenon, as far as the uncertainty principle is concerned, is irrevocably the 
result of the whole experiment, and as such, unanalysable into further causal parts. 
Many, if not all, stances here are the consequence of adopting the uncertainty principle 
as fundamental. From the Kochen-Specker theorem we know, as far as quantum theory 
is concerned, that the uncertainty principle is indeed inescapable. Now, in the 
framework of interpretation presented above, these statements – each and every one of 
them – also become direct consequences of mapping the theory to the phenomena the 
theory is taken to represent. Thus, we have an almost trivial vindication of the 
Copenhagen statements, as presented here, as they are in-built in the way we understand 
interpreting. 
Although this is surely clear enough, let us look, as an example, statement (CS2). This 
is connected with statements (CS7) and (CS8). Upon interpreting the theory into a 
 
83 See page 49. 
84 Here, of course, one needs to define this as fundamental to the theory. 
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certain physical situation, we assign an interpretation to only those components in the 
model which we can map to measurements. Of course, the manner in which the 
components are mapped to phenomena are various. In the STM case, for example, we 
saw that the wave function is confirmed to be a correct instrument for predictions, 
whereas we are able to read the current I(z) from the tip. The bottom line is that the 
measurement determines two things: 
1. Can anything be said about a given component; and 
2. what can be said about a given component, 
and the act of model confirmation is then executed, at all times, in reference to these 
conditions. 
This might seem like a very short and trivial examination of the Copenhagen attitude. 
This is because there is really nothing in the statements above that are not part of 
quantum theory, when stripped to its minimum content by eliminating all extra-
empirical reference. These themes have already been studied thoroughly. And in order 
to avoid confusion and redundancy, other views sometimes considered as part of “the 
Copenhagen interpretation” (e.g. Peres, 1999) are not included here. In any case, it is 
hopefully clear enough that it is highly problematic to think of this as a separate 
“Copenhagen” interpretation of quantum theory. 
What remains to be done now is to measure the score with the de Broglie-Bohm 
interpretation. As seen in chapter III, this framework introduces novel mathematical 
formulations to the standard procedure of quantum theory. Mainly, we have the polar 
wave function as solution to the “quantum Hamilton-Jacobi", with the term Q isolated 
as the surplus term that is added to the classical potential. Physically speaking, we are 
given several different meanings to different terms: 
• 𝑄 =  
ℏ2𝛻2𝑅
2𝑚𝑅
≡ quantum potential 
• 𝜓 = 𝑅e(
𝑖𝑆
ℏ
) ≡ quantum field 
• ?⃗?(𝑟, 𝑡) =
𝛻𝑆(𝑟,𝑡)
𝑚
≡ guidance equation 
These are isolated terms in the overall structure which is non-contradictory with 
standard quantum mechanics. However, we instantly see that these are proposed model 
components. If they are derived from quantum theory by means of correct application of 
the theory, they should correspond to our measurements in the way we interpreted the 
theory to correspond to them. Here, of course, we run into problems. 
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As an easy example, let us stretch our imagination a little and think of a situation where 
an application of quantum theory involved a mathematical model with the term Q taken 
as a measured quantity. In this situation a scientist would like to examine the form of 
the quantum potential of electrons tunnelling through the potential barrier like in the 
STM example presented above. Then, by introducing a special device, called the 
“quantum potential examiner”, located near the tip, the quantum fields 𝜓 associated 
with each electron either reflected from or transmitting through the barrier are read, and 
from these quantum fields, the scientist could construct the quantum potential, which 
should correspond to predicted values. At this point, the scientist could say that the 
model component Q is confirmed to be properly applied from quantum theory, and that 
she has interpreted quantum theory correctly. 
Because of the nature of the quantum potential in the Hamilton-Jacobi formulation, 
however, an experiment such as this cannot be performed. Interpreting Q into an 
experiment such as this would be akin to attempting to measure the wave function, 
which would be an incorrect interpretation of quantum theory. This statement might 
give some pause: both Q and 𝜓 are already known when the experimental arrangement 
is known. Thus, one might argue, that a physical experiment for Q can be indeed 
conducted (in the same indirect sense as for 𝜓). However, physically measurable 
quantities cannot distinguish the terms of Q from any other sequence equivalently non-
contradictory with quantum theory. Another way of saying this is that physical 
experimentation cannot isolate Q in any such way that vindicated the descriptive 
statements associated with it.85 
If, on the other hand, we agree that there is no experiment for Q, nor does Q have any 
role in predicting phenomena, then it is also agreed Q is not a result of interpreting 
quantum theory (in the sense ‘interpretation’ is defined here). This requires some 
illumination. It is not the intent here to claim that the quantum potential or the phase 
function (among other properties of the dB-B) did not do any work in predicting 
quantum phenomena correctly. Such a claim would evidently be false, because the 
omission of these properties in the de Broglie-Bohm formalism would cause its 
predictions to be false or nonsensical. Of course, these remarks apply to 𝜓 as well. 
 
85 The situation is different for the probabilistic interpretation of the wave function. Its physical nature is 
never committed to – it is only required to ascertain that the values of it are correct by producing correct 
probability distributions. 
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However, recall that a model can be evaluated in as many components as can be 
intelligibly specified. In the case of the derivation presented by Bohm in 1952, what is 
confirmed is that the guidance equation and the Hamilton-Jacobi, attained by the polar 
form of the wavefunction, correctly predict the observations of atomic physics. Thus, 
quantum theory can indeed be correctly interpreted in this way. However, further 
analysing these equations into 𝛻𝑆, Q, etc., attention is required. To confirm the positive 
ontological status of these individual components, a demonstration would be required 
that phenomena associated with them could not be predicted without them. If a 
formulation, derived from the same theory, demonstrates the opposite, then such model 
components cannot be confirmed. Thus, they do not strictly follow from the 
interpretation of the theory. 
The preceding four paragraphs might be the most controversial ones in this thesis, 
because the idea that the wave function cannot be observed has been challenged by the 
development of weak measurements. Weak measurement, roughly characterized, is a 
general term for measurements of a quantum system designed to disturb the system as 
little as possible. The varieties of proposals that present a challenge to the preceding 
arguments can be divided into two: the so-called protective measurement techniques 
introduced by Aharonov and Vaidman in 1993 and the modified Stern-Gerlach 
measurement sequence discussed, for example, in Flack & Hiley (2014), Flack & Hiley 
(2015) and Hiley & Van Reeth (2018). Both approaches are an important topic of 
modern quantum mechanics with regrettably little room in this thesis. However, neither 
approach (while being very distinct from each other) demonstrates a circumvention of 
uncertainty relations – which would be required in measuring Q or 𝜓 in our STM 
example. More importantly, there is reason to argue that such a demonstration would 
indeed refute quantum theory – thus the former would not be an interpretation of the 
latter.86 
Moving back to more formal treatment of interpretation, a kind of model-theoretic 
argument for the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation might still be given. This exact 
argument has not, for the best of my knowledge, been presented in relevant literature, 
but it would be roughly of the following form: 
 
86 This having been said, the notion of “direct wave packet measurement” in the wake of Aharonov & 
Vaidman (1993) and the correlations of macroscopic tracks with simulated Bohm trajectories in Hiley & 
van Reeth (2018) do deserve a lot more attention and dissection that can be given here. 
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M1. Quantum theory, purely in and of itself, is an undefined sequence of signs, 
sentences, etc. 
M2. An interpretation fixes the reference of the theory, and is a model, or a set of 
models, of the theory, if the interpretation verifies the theory in reference to 
phenomena. 
M3. The de Broglie-Bohm interpretation, or, the set of models it contains, 
successfully connects quantum theory to empirical phenomena in its own 
mathematical framework. 
M4. Consequently, the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation is both a model and an 
interpretation of quantum theory. 
The straight-forward rebuttal of this argument has to do with the intention87 of the de 
Broglie-Bohm interpretation in connection with understanding model components. 
Now, it needs to be strongly emphasized that there is no technical procedure (such as a 
causal theory of reference, etc.) for determining when a model is confirmed in 
connection to its components and when it is not, but this does not pose a problem, 
because the intention is provided by the author of the model.88 In this instance, the 
intention behind the key model components in the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation is 
that they are given an explicit physical meaning. Thus, we can fix the standard of model 
confirmation in reference to these model components. 
Applying our rules for interpretation of quantum theory – with knowledge of the 
epistemic limitations of quantum theory – it follows that assigning these kinds of 
components does not have epistemic backing. Consequently, a counter-argument to the 
preceding is of the following form: 
cM1. All signs, sentences etc. of quantum theory are interpreted when they are applied 
to represent physical phenomena. 
cM2. A successful application confirms our interpretation of theory to be correct. 
cM3. The model we use to connect the theory to physical phenomena is confirmed as 
the components it contains. 
cM4. The ontological model components in the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation can be 
omitted without effect to quantum theory (in another way of applying quantum 
theory). 
cM5. Thus, these components are not confirmed as correct interpretations of quantum 
theory. 
It is evident that ‘interpretation’, as I suggest it to be understood, is very strict. This 
way, when interpreting quantum theory, very little room is left for matters of taste. 
Consequently, if a proponent of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation held on to a strict 
 
87 This is not to be confused with the idea of intended models. 
88 In order to avoid confusion: the model is always measured against phenomena. But there are many uses 
for a model – for instance, atomic motion can be modelled with spring systems, but this model is only 
valid when it is meant to be an instrument instead of a real physical description. Conversely, if the model 
is intended to state the existence of tiny springs, the model is invalid. What is intended fixes what is 
reviewed. 
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understanding of interpretation (as suggested in this thesis), positive ontological 
statements should be ruled out of its interpretative content. However, letting go of these 
statements completely would likely be unacceptable for a proponent of the de Broglie-
Bohm interpretation. How should these components, then, be understood? I will briefly 
suggest an alternative way in conclusions. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
A summarization of the train of thought in this thesis can now be made. 
CC1. All that can be said about the world in the context of physics is the predictions 
our physical theories make, and quantum physics is no exception. 
CC2. The Copenhagen interpretation is not a distinct interpretation of quantum theory, 
but just a general spirit of limiting our statements to the ones that can be 
justifiably derived from the theory. 
CC3. It is proven by the von Neumann and Kochen-Specker theorems that violating 
the uncertainty principle inside quantum theory is impossible. 
CC4. There is no other theory pertaining to sub-atomic phenomena than quantum 
theory. 
CC5. An interpretation of quantum theory is the correct understanding and application 
of it in reference to physical interactions. 
The first conclusion is a reaffirmation of physics as a positivistic science, while (CC2) 
recognizes the near-trivial interpretative content of the Copenhagen “spirit”. (CC3) and 
(CC4) together ground the fact that if we had a way of violating the uncertainty 
principle, that would be a part of some other theory than quantum theory. Finally, (CC5) 
is shortly what is suggested to be the meaning of the notion “interpretation”. 
The proposed standards of interpretation are not necessarily the definitive truth, but they 
form a robust philosophical basis for the concept in quantum mechanics. If 
interpretations are understood in this way, then it follows that the ontological content of 
the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation is not the result of interpreting quantum theory. If 
one were to disagree with the preceding, then one would need to show exactly how to 
understand the notion of interpretation so that the aforementioned ontological 
statements are vindicated. 
In the wake of the modern quantum theory, especially onwards from the Solvay 
conference of 1927, two opposite attitudes towards the research of sub-atomic 
phenomena started to form – those of restriction and aspiration. Einstein abandoned his 
aspirations for a more complete description of sub-atomic processes as his thought 
experiments failed. After these events, the concept of “interpretations” was introduced 
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to designate alternative formulations of quantum theory that had differing views with 
the base theory’s implications but not its predictions, such as the core89 of the de 
Broglie-Bohm interpretation. Despite this, it is important to note that the connection to 
novel experiments has always been present in the central authors of the interpretation. 
Bohm brought up the possibility of novel causal mechanisms the sub-quantum level 
already in Bohm (1952b, 184—185). The work of Hiley et. al. in the 2010s, especially, 
continues the search for a novel experiment. Thus, importantly, the difference between 
Einstein and several authors on the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation is not exactly clear-
cut. 
However, historically this conceptual separation of attitudes can be understood by the 
fact that before early quantum physics the connection between epistemology and 
ontology was more straightforward: there were no theoretical obstacles to be found in 
improving accuracy of measurement (limitations were a matter of practice, not 
principle). After the formation of quantum theory the tension was then formed, roughly, 
between the following two preferences: 
1. Limiting physics as a strictly epistemological enterprise and pertaining to what 
could be observed by the means of it, and 
2. striving towards a more complete description of reality as such. 
The proponent of the preference (1) can argue that the preference (2) dangers a shift to 
metaphysics; that is, what is beyond physics. And naturally, the proponent of preference 
(2) is right to argue that preference (1) has the problem of defining what ultimately can 
be observed – possibly leading to contradictions with the underlying empirical attitude. 
Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that the terms “philosophical” and 
“interpretation” are not completely neutral terms. Due to the social development in the 
physics community in the 20th century, naming something a priori an “interpretation” 
can include the assumption that the competing view does not have any novel epistemic 
value (Pinch 1977, e.g. 177). The notion of “philosophizing” can also be used to push 
the author of some formulation outside of physics (Hanson in Bohm et. al. 1962, 89—
90.) These hostile social dimensions to the use of the term “interpretation” seem to 
highlight the importance of limiting its actual range, as is done in this thesis. 
As my final statement, I argue that through the discussions in this thesis we see a 
potentially fruitful alternative way of understanding the ontological content in the de 
Broglie-Bohm interpretation. A realistic description is preferred by many of its 
 
89 Using the polar form of the wave function to attain the quantum Hamilton-Jacobi. 
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proponents, of course, because it provides an explanation of the quantum phenomena. 
Along these lines were Bohm and Hiley themselves: 
In this way we explain why the opening of a second slit can prevent 
particles from arriving at points […] (Bohm & Hiley 1993, 32.) 
In this explanation of the quantum properties of the electron, the fact that 
the quantum potential depends only on the form and not on the amplitude 
of the quantum field is evidently of crucial significance. (Bohm & Hiley 
1993, 35.) 
Especially Bricmont doubles down on this. His whole idea of what he calls the de 
Broglie-Bohm theory is that it provides a scientific explanation of quantum mechanics 
(Bricmont 2016, 161—162): 
[I]t is the de Broglie-Bohm theory that explains why ordinary quantum 
mechanics is sufficient [for all practical purposes], something that is true 
but mysterious without de Broglie-Bohm. 
It could be, then, reasonable to think of the ontological content in the de Broglie-Bohm 
as an explanation rather than an interpretation. A natural follow-up to this would be 
then to examine the nature of explanation at hand. Regarding scientific explanations in 
the context of natural sciences, the structure of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation 
could be studied as a causal explanation.  
One of the goals of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation, as is at this point well 
understood, is to give a description of what happens at a very primitive level of reality 
relating to phenomena described by quantum theory. It follows that this description is 
realistic, at least when thought of as a hypothesis, as Bohm did. Moreover, it includes 
numerous novel causal claims. For instance, active information is fed by the pilot wave 
to the particle, which modulates its behaviour with respect to the content of this 
information. This is possible because the particle has an inner structure capable of 
processing information. In any experimental setup, this active information is included in 
the quantum potential. 
This seems to have potential to be a more fruitful way to understand interpretations of 
quantum mechanics in general. As long as quantum theory is the only theory of sub-
atomic phenomena, it follows that interpretations of it share its constraints. Thus, 
accounts that go “above and beyond”, as it were, must do something on top of 
interpreting. Whether that something is new predictions or novel ontological 
implications, they differ from interpreting quantum theory – the former, very likely, 
contradicting it. It may well be the case that not all or even most interpretations of 
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quantum mechanics seek to explain – but those containing ontological accounts might. 
One then ends up with natural follow-up questions. How does the de Broglie-Bohm 
interpretation look as a causal explanation? Are there other competing explanations 
among interpretations of quantum mechanics – for instance, does the many-worlds 
interpretation attempt a comparable ontology?  
There is more work to be done for better philosophical understanding of interpretations. 
Moreover, the crucial study of the epistemological basis of quantum theory is far from 
over – even if it has been slightly forgotten after the early days of the branch. 
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